�� Johnson�s Hidden Loyalties

Secret Ethnicity: As previously stated, the Johnson administration implemented a dramatic shift in US‑Middle East policy. Every president after Johnson has totally capitulated to Israel and ignored the plight of Palestinians. But Johnson marked the turning point. The reason he was so loyal to Israel lies within his own ethnicity. It appears that he and his wife were secretly Jewish. To many, this may seem laughable at first, but in reality Jews were an integral part of Texas history throughout the nineteenth century.

1). Jacob and Phineas De Cordova sold land and developed Waco. Simon Mussina founded Brownsville in 1848. Michael Seeligson was elected mayor of Galveston in 1853. Morris Lasker was elected to the state Senate in 1895. (Rabbi James L. Kessler, Handbook of Texas (online), http://www.tsha.utexas.edu/handbook/online/articles/view/JJ/pxj1.html)

2). The list goes on. (Rabbi James L. Kessler, Handbook of Texas (online), http://www.tsha.utexas.edu/handbook/online/articles/view/JJ/pxj1.html)

The first Jewish settlers of note in Texas were Samuel Issacks (1821) followed by N. Adolphus Sterne (1826). (Rabbi James L. Kessler, Handbook of Texas (online), http://www.tsha.utexas.edu/handbook/online/articles/view/JJ/pxj1.html) By 1838, Jews were living in Galveston, San Antonio, Velasco, Bolivar, Nacogdoches, and Goliad. (Rabbi James L. Kessler, Handbook of Texas (online), http://www.tsha.utexas.edu/handbook/online/articles/view/JJ/pxj1.html) In the early part of the twentieth century, a large of number of Russian Jews migrated to Texas to escape persecution from the Russian Czar. Between 1900 and 1920, the Jewish population in Texas grew from 15,000 to 30,000. Major cities, Dallas, Houston, Fort Worth, and San Antonio, experienced enormous growth in Jewish populations. (Rabbi James L. Kessler, Handbook of Texas (online), http://www.tsha.utexas.edu/handbook/online/articles/view/JJ/pxj1.html) The overall number of Jews in Texas has steadily increased ever since. After World War II, the abundance of Jewish residents grew from an estimated 50,000 in 1945 to 71,000 in the mid‑1970s and 92,000 in 1988. (Rabbi James L. Kessler, Handbook of Texas (online), http://www.tsha.utexas.edu/handbook/online/articles/view/JJ/pxj1.html)

Before 1821, Texas was still a Spanish colony where only Catholics could take up residence. Jews who openly acknowledged their ethnicity could not legally live there. (Rabbi James L. Kessler, Handbook of Texas (online), http://www.tsha.utexas.edu/handbook/online/articles/view/JJ/pxj1.html) Originally, Jews migrated to Texas to seek fortune and freedom. The earliest Jews, who arrived with the conquistadors, came from Sephardic (Spanish‑North African‑Israel) communities. (Rabbi James L. Kessler, Handbook of Texas (online), http://www.tsha.utexas.edu/handbook/online/articles/view/JJ/pxj1.html) After the Mexican period, Jewry in Texas was essentially populated by immigrants from Germany, eastern Europe, and the Americas. (Rabbi James L. Kessler, Handbook of Texas (online), http://www.tsha.utexas.edu/handbook/online/articles/view/JJ/pxj1.html)

Lyndon Johnson�s maternal ancestors, the Huffmans, apparently migrated to Frederick, Maryland from Germany sometime in the mid‑eighteenth century. Later they moved to Bourbon, Kentucky and eventually settled in Texas in the mid‑to‑late nineteenth century. (Internet, familysearch.org (geneology website for the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints)

According to Jewish law, if a person�s mother is Jewish, then that person is automatically Jewish, regardless of the father�s ethnicity or religion. The facts indicate that both of Lyndon Johnson�s great‑grandparents, on the maternal side, were Jewish. These were the grandparents of Lyndon�s mother, Rebecca Baines. (Robert Caro, Path to Power, p. 50) Their names were John S. Huffman and Mary Elizabeth Perrin. (Internet, family search.org (geneology website for the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints) NOTE: I did a search on the parents of Ruth Ament Huffman, wife of Joseph Baines. The website search indicated that Ruth Ament Huffman�s parents were Mary Elizabeth Perrin and John S. Huffman) John Huffman�s mother was Suzanne Ament, a common Jewish name. Perrin is also a common Jewish name.

Huffman and Perrin had a daughter, Ruth Ament Huffman, (Robert Caro, Path to Power, p 850 (Index: Ruth Ament Huffman, "LBJ�s grandmother," is listed under "Baines.")) who married Joseph Baines (Robert Caro, Path to Power, p. 850 (Index: Joseph Wilson Baines, "LBJ�s grandfather," is listed under "Baines.")) and together they had a daughter, Rebekah Baines, (Robert Caro, Path to Power, p. 50) Lyndon Johnson�s mother. The line of Jewish mothers can be traced back three generations in Lyndon Johnson�s family tree. There is little doubt that he was Jewish.

To recap, the following is Lyndon Johnson�s maternal family tree:

Mother: Rebekah Baines (married Sam Johnson, Lyndon�s father)

Maternal grandparents: Ruth Ament Huffman and Joseph Baines

Maternal great‑grandparents (parents of Ruth Huffman): Mary Elizabeth Perrin and John S. Huffman, III

Maternal great‑great grandparents (parents of Mary Perrin): Dicea Kerby and William Perrin (Internet, familysearch.org (geneology website for the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints) NOTE: I did a search on the parents of Mary Perrin, wife of John Huffman. The website search indicated that Mary Perrin�s parents were Dicea Kerby and William Perrin)

Maternal great‑great grandparents (parents of John Huffman, III): Suzanne Ament and John S. Huffman, II (Internet, familysearch.org (geneology website for the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints) NOTE: I did a search on the parents of John S. Huffman, husband of Mary Elizabeth Perrin. The website search indicated that John S. Huffman�s parents were Suzanne Ament and John S. Huffman)

Maternal great‑great‑great grandparents (parents of John Huffman, II): Cathrine Lyter and John Huffman (Internet, familysearch.org (geneology website for the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints) NOTE: I did a search on the parents of John S. Huffman, husband of Mary Elizabeth Perrin. The website search indicated that John S. Huffman�s parents were Suzanne Ament and John S. Huffman))

As previously stated, many Jews migrated to Texas from Germany. A Johnson family friend, Cynthia Crider, observed that Lyndon�s mother, Rebekah Baines (Johnson), often boasted of her Baines ancestry, but rarely mentioned the maternal side, the Huffmans. In fact, Crider recalled that Lyndon�s father, Sam Johnson, used to tease his wife occasionally about her German heritage. When she would get stubborn about something, Sam would say, "That�s your German blood again. German blood! Look at your brother�s name. Huffman! Probably was Hoffmann once�in Berlin." Rebekah would respond, "Sam, you know it�s Holland Dutch." (Robert Caro, Path to Power, p. 61)

As far as I can determine, Rebekah�s German ancestors, the Huffmans, came to America in the mid‑1700s and had a son, John Huffman, in about 1767 in Frederick, Maryland. I cannot find records of John Huffman�s parents. They were probably German immigrants. Huffman married Catherine Lyter in 1790 in Frederick, Maryland. (Internet, familysearch.org (geneology website for the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints)) At some point Huffman and Lyter moved to Bourbon, Kentucky and had a son, John Huffman, II, who married Suzanne Ament. Huffman, II and Ament had a son, John S. Huffman, III, born on May 7, 1824 in Bourbon, Kentucky; and died on June 22, 1865 in Collin, Texas. John Huffman, III was Rebekah�s great‑grandfather. He married Mary Elizabeth Perrin. Huffman and Perrin had a daughter, Ruth Ament Huffman, who married Joseph Baines. Huffman and Baines were Rebekah�s parents, Lyndon�s grandparents.

As a young adult, Lyndon Johnson taught school in

Cotulla, a poor "Mexican" community south of San Antonio. (Robert Caro, Path to Power, pp. 166‑169) Many of his former students marvelled at his spirit, dedication and self‑discipline. (Robert Caro, Path to Power, pp. 166‑169) Lyndon strongly encouraged the young Mexicans to learn English in order to get ahead. (Robert Caro, Path to Power, pp. 166‑169) Possibly he truly had a yearning to help those in need; however, that does not fit most historical accounts of Lyndon Johnson the man. From early adulthood, virtually all of his actions were calculated. Given Lyndon�s Huffman, Perrin, Ament family line, it is more likely that he was assisting descendants of Sephardic Jews who migrated to Texas from Spain centuries earlier.

Recently it was disclosed that there are many hispanic Jews living in the San Antonio area. Richard Santos, a hispanic Jew and native of San Antonio, wrote a book entitled Silent Heritage: The Sephardim and the Colonization of the Spanish North American Frontier, 1492‑1600. (David Garza, The Secret History, May 11, 2001, The Austin Chronicle: Books,

http://www.austinchronicle.com/issues/dispatch/2001‑05‑11/books_feature.html) Santos spoke of his "crypto‑Jewish" heritage at the Texas Jewish Historical Society�s 22^nd conference on May 11, 2001. Crypto‑Jews are Sephardic groups of families who secretly retained their religion and culture after the 15th‑century Spanish royal decree deemed it punishable by death. Santos has spent his entire adult life trying to educate the masses about the secret history of his bloodline. (David Garza, The Secret History, May 11, 2001, The Austin Chronicle: Books,

http://www.austinchronicle.com/issues/dispatch/2001‑05‑11/books_feature.html)

Stan Hordes, a former New Mexico state historian and professor at the University of New Mexico, described his observations at the same conference.

"One person told me, �My family just doesn�t eat pork�we�re allergic to pork,�" Hordes said, explaining the pockets of crypto‑Jews who maintain Jewish traditions without even realizing it. (David Garza, The Secret History, May 11, 2001, The Austin Chronicle: Books,

http://www.austinchronicle.com/issues/dispatch/2001‑05‑11/books_feature.html)

Among the crypto‑Jews that Hordes described, some of the women light menorahs without realizing what they�re doing. (David Garza, The Secret History, May 11, 2001, The Austin Chronicle: Books,

http://www.austinchronicle.com/issues/dispatch/2001‑05‑11/books_feature.html)

Given this new information about crypto‑Jews, plus Johnson�s heritage; it is highly plausible that he began his early adult life as a teacher at Cotulla not merely to help disadvantaged hispanics students, but rather to help descendants of Sephardic Jews�crypto‑Jews�from Spain who migrated to Mexico and what is now southern Texas. And the reason he felt obliged to help these crypto‑Jews was because of his own secret ethnicity.

This information about Sephardic Jews in southern Texas sheds new light on the ethnicity of Lyndon Johnson�s wife, Claudia Alta Taylor Johnson (aka, "Lady Bird"). She is apparently a Sephardic Jew of Mexican origin. Although her facial features are consistent with Semitic origin, that alone is not definitive proof. Claudia�s mother, Minnie Lee Pattillo, was likely a Sephardic Jew from Mexico. Pattillo is a common Spanish/Mexican name; however, there are no records of Minnie Pattillo�s parents so it is entirely possible that they were immigrants. It is quite odd that a first lady�one who lived in the White House less than 40 years ago�has maternal grandparents whose identity is unknown and undocumented.

Minnie Pattillo died in 1918 when Claudia was only five. (David Garza, The Secret History, May 11, 2001, The Austin Chronicle: Books,

http://www.austinchronicle.com/issues/dispatch/2001‑05‑11/books_feature.html) Minnie was born in about 1890 in Karnack, Texas (Harrison County); (David Garza, The Secret History, May 11, 2001, The Austin Chronicle: Books,

http://www.austinchronicle.com/issues/dispatch/2001‑05‑11/books_feature.html) however, she apparently lived in Alabama when Thomas Taylor married her. (Robert Caro, Path to Power, p. 295) All that is known about Minnie Pattillo is that she had a "spinster" sister, Effie Pattillo (also from Alabama), who helped raise Claudia. (Robert Caro, Path to Power, p. 296)

Claudia Taylor�s father was Thomas Jefferson Taylor, II, a prosperous businessman and philanthropist. (Mark Odintz, Handbook of Texas (online), http://www.tsha.utexas.edu/handbook/online/articles/view/TT/fta26.html) He was the son of Thomas Jefferson Taylor and Emma Louisa Bates. (Internet, familysearch.org (geneology website for the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints)) Historian Robert Caro wrote that Claudia�s father was the "richest man in [Karnack, Texas]." (Robert Caro, Path to Power, p. 294) Caro also indicated that Johnson�s previous two girlfriends�Carol Davis and Kitty Clyde of San Marcos and Johnson City, respectively�were also daughters of the richest men in town.

1931: Johnson Came to Washington as Congressman Kleberg�s Assistant

Lyndon Johnson began his career in 1931 as the legislative assistant of Congressman Richard M. Kleberg, a wealthy Jewish politician representing the 14th District of Texas. Kleberg was not a serious politician, rather an outwardly friendly man who inherited vast wealth. "A sweeter man that Dick Kleberg never lived," a friend said. "But he was a playboy. As for work, he had no interest in that whatsover." (Robert Caro, Path to Power, p. 219)

Richard Kleberg was one of the wealthiest men in Texas. He inherited twenty percent interest in the King Ranch, the largest ranch in the continental United States; (Encyclopedia Britannica: King Ranch) a 2,000‑square‑mile estate with influence extending beyond its borders. (Robert Caro, Path to Power, p. 219) In fact, Richard Kleberg�s father, Robert Kleberg, turned much of South Texas into "Kleberg County." (Robert Caro, Path to Power, p. 219) Although the ranch dealt in cattle and horses, as well as in sorghum and wheat, (Encyclopedia Britannica: King Ranch) it also built entire towns, railroads, harbors, colleges, and banks. (Robert Caro, Path to Power, p. 219) In the 1940s, it contracted oil and gas leases to provide additional income. By the mid‑1970s, the ranch owned millions of acres of land in such countries as Australia, Argentina, Brazil, Venezuela, and Morocco; but falling market prices caused them to sell off much of this land in the 1980s. (Encyclopedia Britannica: King Ranch)

The King Ranch was founded in 1852 by Richard King (Richard Kleberg�s grandfather), and was expanded significantly by King�s son‑in‑law, Robert Kleberg (Richard Kleberg�s father). (Encyclopedia Britannica: King Ranch) In 1922 Robert Kleberg suffered a stroke and Richard was put in charge of the King Ranch. But Richard�s lack of business skills soon caused the King empire to fall into serious financial difficulties. In 1927, the executors of his father�s estate removed Richard from authority and put his younger brother in charge of managing the Ranch. Soon the empire was back on its feet. This did not bother Richard because he did not relish the notion of being a businessman. (Encyclopedia Britannica: King Ranch)

Richard Kleberg ran for an open congressional seat merely as a favor to friend, Roy Miller, former "boy mayor of Corpus Christi" and lobbyist for the gigantic Texas Gulf Sulphur Corporation. (Robert Caro, Path to Power, p. 220) Kleberg replaced Harry Wurchbach who died on November 6, 1931. At that time, Wurchbach was the only Republican Congressman from Texas. (Robert Caro, Path to Power, p. 218) With Kleberg�s election, the Democrats gained control of the House. The new Speaker of the House of Representative was John Nance Garner(Footnote 21) of Texas. Miller was a Garner ally, and in Miller�s view, the main qualification for the Democratic nominee to replace Wurchbach was electability. And no one was more popular in the 14^th District than a member of the Kleberg family. (Robert Caro, Path to Power, p. 220)

After easily winning the election, Kleberg gave Miller, the lobbyist, carte blanche permission to use his Capitol Hill office as if it were his own. Often Kleberg never went to the office at all. In essence, Miller was the unelected congressman for the 14^th District and Kleberg was merely a figurehead; (Robert Caro, Path to Power, p. 220) however, the work of the Kleberg�s constituency was left to his legislative assistant, Lyndon Johnson. (Robert Caro, Path to Power, p. 221)

Under Miller�s tutelage, Johnson learned to play hardball politics. When Kleberg�s bid for re‑election was challenged in the 1932 Democratic primary by a more liberal candidate, Carl Wright Johnson; Lyndon Johnson, Roy Miller and another Texas politician, Welly Hopkins, maligned the challenger�s character, calling him a "communist," guilty of "radicalism" and "similar filth and slime." (Robert Caro, Path to Power, p. 272) Carl Johnson didn�t have a chance in a district so thoroughly controlled by the King Ranch. Newspapers gave him limited coverage. (Robert Caro, Path to Power, p. 272) Needless to say, the challenger lost. (Robert Caro, Path to Power, p. 293)

Ironically, Kleberg won ten of eleven counties in his district; but the one he lost was Lyndon Johnson�s home county of Blanco. Some residents of the county felt that Kleberg lost in Blanco because many of the voters disliked the congressman�s legislative assistant. According to Johnson�s aid, Gene Latimer, "He worked hard�he just broke his back�to get those people to like him, but they just didn�t." (Robert Caro, Path to Power, p. 293)

Johnson�s Mentor, Senator Alvin Jacob Wirtz

Alvin Jacob Wirtz was a lawyer and legislator, first a state senator from Texas, then a United States Senator for the same state. In 1935, Wirtz came to Washington and helped organize the Lower Colorado River Authority. He specialized in oil and water law and was appointed general counsel to the newly established LCRA. Working closely with United States Representative Lyndon Johnson, he helped the river authority secure grants and loans from the Public Works Administration, the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, and the Rural Electrification Administration. (Michael L. Gillette, Handbook of Texas (online), http://www.tsha.utexas.edu/handbook/online/articles/view/WW/fwi70.html)

More than any one person, Alvin Wirtz helped pave Lyndon Johnson�s early rise to power. Ed Clark, a colleague of Wirtz� for years said of him, "What he wanted was P‑O‑W‑E‑R�power over other men. He wanted power, but he didn�t want to get it by running for office. He liked to sit quietly, smoke a cigar. He would sit and work in his library, and plan and scheme, and usually he would get somebody out in front of him so that nobody knew it was Alvin Wirtz who was doing it. He would sit and scheme in the dark. He wasn�t an outgoing person. But he was the kind of person who didn�t want to lose any fights. And he didn�t lose many." (Robert Caro, Path to Power, pp. 373)

As an attorney, Wirtz had a reputation among collegues for being ruthless. A San Antonio attorney observed that he was "a conniver�a conniver like I never saw before or since. Sharp, cunning." Another attorney commented that "He would gut you if he could. But you would probably never know he did it. I mean, that was a man who would do anything�and he would still be smiling when he slipped you the knife." (Robert Caro, Path to Power, pp. 376)

In 1917 Wirtz moved his family to Seguin, where he continued his law practice until 1934. From 1922 to 1930 Wirtz served as state senator from Guadalupe County. During his time in the legislature, Wirtz became involved with a group of citizens interested in the development of the Guadalupe River as a source of hydroelectric power. (Michael L. Gillette, Handbook of Texas (online), http://www.tsha.utexas.edu/handbook/online/articles/view/WW/fwi70.html) As someone driven by a need to obtain power over men, Wirtz viewed dams as a means of acquiring it. (Robert Caro, Path to Power, pp. 376)

In 1934 Wirtz moved to Austin after being run out of Seguin by disgruntled farmers who believed his dam projects had cheated them out of their land. This was result of his dealings with businessman Samuel Insull of Chicago. Insull had retained Wirtz to procure land from farmers along the Guadalupe River for the purpose of building six small dams for irrigation. The farmers were unwilling to sell, but through legal maneuvering, Wirtz got the government to purchase the farmers� land at low prices. On February 26, 1934, Tom Hollamon, Sr�a sixty‑seven‑year‑old farmer and former Texas Ranger�walked into Wirtz�s office, where he was meeting with Insull representatives, and began shooting. Before being disarmed, one Chicago financier was dead. Hollamon was arrested for murder, but Wirtz was quickly run out of town by the locals. (Robert Caro, Path to Power, pp. 376‑377)

In Austin Wirtz organized the law firm of Powell, Wirtz, Rauhut, and Gideon. Things seemed bleak for awhile, but Roosevelt�s New Deal gave him a chance to revive his dream of becoming a power mogul. During Roosevelt�s "Hundred Days" portion of the New Deal, $3.3 billion of federal money was slowly released into the economy for public works which included dams. Eventually a $10,000,000 dam project, the Marshall Ford Dam, became the vehicle by which Wirtz could acquire the power he sought. The contract was awarded to one of Wirtz� clients, Brown & Root. (Robert Caro, Path to Power, pp 378‑379)

Brown & Root: Johnson�s Primary Financial Supporter

Throughout Lyndon Johnson�s career, Brown & Root was his biggest financial supporter. Today the company is a huge defense contractor. It was founded by Herman Brown in the 1920s. The son of a Belton, Texas shopkeeper, Herman�s career had a humble beginning. But Alvin Wirtz and Lyndon Johnson helped Brown & Root acquire huge defense contracts from President Roosevelt in the late 1930s. The company prospered a great deal after America�s entry into World War II. Brown & Root returned the favor by giving Johnson virtually any financial help he requested.

Brown & Root continued to grow as the primary contractor for building military bases. When Johnson got America into the Vietnam War, Brown & Root made a fortune constructing military bases in Southeast Asia. They built the Tan Son Nhut Air Base and reportedly built many of the infamous tiger cages used to brutalize and torture suspected enemies of the Saigon regime. (Reliable source within the intelligence community (deceased)) Tiger Cages were cells constructed below ground with just enough room to fit one person. Prisoners were put in these as punishment for various infractions of the rules.

As of this writing (2002) Brown & Root is owned by the Halliburton Company, a prestigious defense contractor based in Dallas, Texas. Until July 25, 2000, Vice‑President Dick Cheney was CEO and chairman of the board of the Halliburton Company. The following is a profile of the Halliburton Company from Yahoo.com stock quotes:

�� Business Summary

Halliburton Company provides services and equipment to energy, industrial and governmental customers. The Company operates in two business segments: Energy Services Group and Engineering and Construction Group. The Energy Services Group provides a range of discrete services and products to customers for the exploration, development and production of oil and gas. The segment serves independent, integrated and national oil companies. The Engineering and Construction Group segment, consisting of Kellogg Brown & Root and Brown & Root Services, provides a range of services to energy and industrial customers and government entities worldwide. Halliburton operates in 120 countries.

�� Financial Summary

Halliburton Company provides a variety of services, equipment, maintenance, and engineering and construction to energy, industrial and govermental customers. For the nine months ended 9/30/01, revenues rose 13% to $9.87 billion. Net income from continuing operations before account. Change increased 96% to $410 million. Revenues reflect higher rig counts and increased prices. Earnings also reflect increased utilization of equipment and personnel.

�� The Rags to Riches Story

�� of Brown & Root

At the age of sixteen (1909), Herman Brown got a job earning two dollars a day carrying a rod to assist surveyors. For ten years, he lived in a crowded tent for members of the construction crew. In fact, when he got married in 1917, he and his wife, Margaret Root, spent their wedding night in a tent, and a tent was their first home. (Robert Caro, Path to Power, pp. 369‑371)

At the age of twenty‑one, Herman became a contractor. At that time, successful contractors had to know how to handle mules and men. Herman quickly gained a reputation for getting the maximum amount of work from men working on construction contracts. Later, he took on two partners. As a favor to his wife, Margaret Root, Herman made her brother, Dan Root, a partner; along with Herman�s brother George. When Dan Root died, the firm�s name remained unchanged out of affection to Herman�s wife. (Robert Caro, Path to Power, p 371)

After the success of the Marshall Ford Dam, Herman Brown was looking for even bigger projects for his construction company. Something big was about to happen. In 1938, Congress, at President Roosevelt�s request, had authorized the expenditure of a billion dollars on a "two‑ocean" Navy. By early 1939 it had become clear that a substantial portion of that billion would be spent on the construction of naval bases and training stations for a greatly expanded Navy Air Force. On April 26, 1939, Roosevelt had signed into law a bill authorizing the expenditure of $66,800,000 for the first of such bases. Brown�s attention was already focused on the Navy because Lyndon Johnson was a member of the Naval Affairs Committee. He decided to bid on one of the bases�in San Juan, Puerto Rico�authorized in the April bill. Unfortunately, Johnson did not have enough influence within the White House, and Brown was not awarded the San Juan contract. (Robert Caro, Path to Power, pp. 581‑582)

An important political dynamic had developed between President Roosevelt and his Texan Vice‑President John Garner. In 1937 the conservative Garner broke with liberal Roosevelt over the latter's plan to enlarge the Supreme Court. In 1940 Garner challenged Roosevelt for the Democratic presidential nomination but lost. (Encyclopedia Britannica: John Garner) Meanwhile, there was talk of another naval air base for Texas, on the Gulf of Corpus Christi. Obviously Brown wanted that contract, but he had been a Garner supporter for years. So had Corpus Christi�s Congressman, Richard Kleberg. In fact, Kleberg�s primary handler, Roy Miller, was Garner�s campaign manager. Lyndon Johnson too, had long supported Garner. All parties knew that in order to get the Corpus Christi contract, they would have to unilaterally endorse Roosevelt over Garner. The Texans chose to drop Garner by sending a subtle political signal to Roosevelt rather than overtly pledging their support to him. (Robert Caro, Path to Power, pp. 582‑583)

In the midst of this turmoil, George Brown wrote a letter to Johnson pledging his support: In the past I have not been very timid about asking you to do favors for me and hope you will not get any timidity if you have anything at all that you think I can or should do. Remember that I am for you, right or wrong, and it makes no difference if I think you are right or wrong. If you want it, I am for it 100%. (Robert Caro, Path to Power, pp. 583)

In Houston, where Brown & Root�s headquarters were located, Herman Brown�s political influence was growing, and the city�s Congressman, Albert Thomas, a junior Representative with negligible clout in Washington, was known to take Herman�s orders unquestionably. In August, Congressman Thomas had said, "Of course every member of the Texas delegation is for Vice President Garner." In December 1939, Thomas made another statement. He was not for Garner after all, he said. He was for Roosevelt. (Robert Caro, Path to Power, pp. 583) This was a signal to Roosevelt, sent by Johnson et al, that they had dumped their longtime political ally, John Garner.

Roosevelt responded positively with two reciprocal signals. First, on January 2, 1940, he appointed Alvin J. Wirtz as Under Secretary of the Interior. Wirtz was the attorney for Brown & Root and had been recommended by Lyndon Johnson. Wirtz would be second in command only to Harold Ickes. Second, the White House went out of its way to cite Representative Lyndon Johnson as the person who "presented Wirtz�s name." Presidential Secretary Stephen Early stated that "neither Texas Senator was consulted," nor was Speaker of the House Sam Rayburn or Secretary of Commerce Jesse Jones. To readers of political signals, it was clear that Lyndon Johnson had become a key White House ally. (Robert Caro, Path to Power, pp. 583‑584)

In addition, the Navy Department was quietly informed by the White House that Lyndon Johnson was to be consulted�and advice taken�on the awarding of Navy contracts in Texas. (Robert Caro, Path to Power, pp. 584)

Consequently, Brown & Root began obtaining coveted Navy Department contracts. The Corpus Christi Naval Air Station was awarded to Brown & Root without competitive bidding. Instead it was awarded on a "negotiated basis." Because the contract was so big, Brown & Root was directed by the Roosevelt administration to share the profits with another contractor, Kaiser. (Robert Caro, Path to Power, pp. 584‑585)

�� Friendship With J. Edgar Hoover

It has been well documented that Hoover and Johnson had been friends since 1945 when a young Senator Johnson and his family moved onto the same block of Washington�s Thirtieth Place where Hoover lived. (Jim Marrs, Crossfire, p. 223)

John Edgar Hoover (1895 ‑ 1972) was born in Washington, DC�the youngest of four children�and rarely left the city his entire life. He lived with his mother at 413 Seward Square until her death in 1938. Afterward he continued living there with his companion and associate director at the FBI, Clyde Tolson. (Jim Marrs, Crossfire, p. 214) It is common knowledge that the two were homosexual lovers.

In 1917, Hoover entered the Department of Justice as a file reviewer. Within two years he became special assistant to Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer in the Woodrow Wilson administration. In that position, he oversaw the mass roundups and deportations of suspected Bolsheviks (Communists) after World War I. In May of 1924, he was named acting director of the Bureau of Investigation (as it was then called) and confirmed as director seven months later. Finding the Bureau in disarray because of the scandals of the Harding administration, he reorganized and rebuilt it, establishing a fingerprint file, which became the world's largest; a scientific crime‑detection laboratory; and the FBI National Academy, to which selected law enforcement officers from all parts of the country were sent for special training. (Encyclopedia Britannica: J. Edgar Hoover)

By the early 1930s, the Bureau was involved in the pursuit of Bonnie and Clyde and the Ma Barker Gang, the shooting and killing of notorious bank robber John Dillinger, investigating the kidnapping of Charles Lindbergh�s infant son, and countless other sensational stories. (Jim Marrs, Crossfire, p. 218; Encyclopedia Britannica: John Dillinger)

In the summer of 1936, Hoover began to have secret meetings with President Roosevelt where the FBI was granted executive authority to expand into intelligence gathering�particularly in areas of subversive activities in America, including Communism and fascism. With Roosevelt�s support, the FBI grew from 391 agents in 1933 to nearly 5,000 by the end of World War II. (Jim Marrs, Crossfire, p. 220)

After war, the Hoover exploited anticommunist hysteria of the Cold War to intensify the FBI�s intelligence activities. It is widely known that Hoover leaked derogatory material on Martin Luther King in the 1960s as part of his secret counterintelligence (COINTELPRO) program. Former assistant FBI Director William Sullivan commented on Hoover�s surveillance of Kennedy and King in a book, The Bureau, published posthumously in 1979.(Footnote 22) The following is an excerpt from that book:

Hoover was always gathering damaging material on Jack Kennedy, which the President, with his active social life, seemed more than willing to provide. We never put any technical surveillance on JFK, but whatever came up was automatically funneled directly to Hoover. I was sure he was saving everything he had on Kennedy, and on Martin Luther King, Jr., too, until he could unload it all and destroy them both. He kept this kind of explosive material in his personal files, which filled four rooms on the fifth floor of headquarters. (William Sullivan, The Bureau, p. 50) (The quotation from William Sullivan, regarding Hoover�s surveillance of JFK and MLK, was obtained from Jim Marrs�s book, Crossfire pp. 221 ‑ 222. Marrs cited William Sullivan�s posthumous book, The Bureau, p. 50)

Hoover�s view of organized crime was astonishing, to say the least. As late as January 1962, Hoover denied its existence in the United States. He stated that "No single individual or coalition of racketeers dominates organized crime across the nation." It was not until gangster Joe Valachi was brought to Washington by Attorney General Robert Kennedy�s Justice Department to testify before the Senate that Hoover was forced to admit that his opinion about organized crime in American needed some serious re‑thinking. (Jim Marrs, Crossfire, pp. 216 ‑ 217)

In January 1964, shortly after Hoover�s 69^th birthday (January 1^st) and less than two months after Kennedy�s assassination, President Johnson signed an Executive Order exempting Hoover from retiring on his 70^th birthday, which was mandatory at that time. It should be noted that Johnson was also gearing up the Warren Commission to investigate Kennedy�s death in that timeframe. Consequently, it is not implausible to think that Johnson�s Executive Order may have been an incentive to Hoover not to conduct a serious investigation of the assassination. It might have been a reward as well, since many of the FBI�s cover‑up activities had already been accomplished by January. (Jim Marrs, Crossfire, pp. 223 ‑ 224. Marrs cited Executive Order 11154 as the tool used by Johnson to exempt Hoover from mandatory retirement at age 70)

Sullivan also observed that the relationship between Johnson and Hoover changed after Johnson assumed the presidency. The following is an excerpt from Sullivan�s posthumous book, The Bureau:

They remained close when Johnson served as Vice� President, but there was a change in their relationship when Johnson became President. The Director was over 65 by that time, past retirement age for federal employees, and he stayed in office only because of a special waiver which required the President�s signature each year. That waiver put Hoover right in Johnson�s pocket. With that leverage, Johnson began to take advantage of Hoover, using the Bureau as his personal investigative arm. His never‑ending requests were usually political, and sometimes illegal�And Hoover hot‑footed it to Johnson�s demands�he found himself very much in the back seat, almost a captive of the President�(William Sullivan, The Bureau, pp. 60 ‑ 61, The quotation from William Sullivan, regarding Johnson and Hoover�s relation, was obtained from Jim Marrs�s book, Crossfire, p. 224. Marrs cited William Sullivan�s posthumous book, The Bureau, pp. 60 ‑ 61)

�� LBJ�s "Passionate Attachment" to Israel

As some readers may know, the term "passionate attachment" was used by George Washington in his farewell address in 1796. Washington advised citizens of the new republic to renounce any "passionate attachment"(Footnote 23) with another nation, and also to repudiate "inveterate hatred" toward another country. In the Twentieth Century, the United States failed to heed Washington�s warnings on both counts. Shortly after World War II, we developed an "inveterate hatred" of the Soviet Union and formed a "passionate attachment" to Israel, although the latter accelerated dramatically under the Johnson Administration.

President Dwight D. Eisenhower was the last American president in the Twentieth Century to successfully stand up to the pressures and unyielding annoyances of the Israeli government and its American supporters. Although President Kennedy shared his predecessor�s views intellectually, he entered the White House after an extremely close election. Consequently, he had to assume a more cautious approach.

The Eisenhower administration�s Middle East policy is important for two reasons. First of all, it demonstrated that a strong American president can stand up to Israel. Secondly, it reveals that Lyndon Johnson; then Senate Majority Leader, was Eisenhower�s most influential political adversary regarding Israel.

Two major incidents occurred on Eisenhower�s watch where Israel acted as an aggressor toward its neighbors and toward Palestinians living in the region. The first incident occurred in 1953 and involved Israel�s effort to secretly divert waters of the Jordan. The second incident occurred in 1957 when Israel conspired with France and Britain to attack Egypt and overthrow that country�s leader, President Gamal Abdel Nasser, after he nationalized the Suez Canal in defiance of Israel and the Western powers. In the latter incident, Lyndon Johnson used all of his political muscle as Senate Majority Leader to prevent the UN

from imposing sanctions on Israel; the sanctions were fully supported by the Eisenhower administration, for its flagrant

disregard for international law. In both instances, Eisenhower forced Israel to behave by temporarily cutting off American aid.

�� The Jordan River Diversion

Israel secretly planned to use the Palestinian village of Banat Ya�qub for a major water diversion project that would move waters of the Jordan Valley to central Israel and the North Negev. The UN, the US, and the Palestinians who lived in that area were unaware of Israel�s plans. Earlier, the Eisenhower administration had offered to implement an American‑sponsored regional water‑usage plan, and Israel had promised to cooperate in that effort. But in reality, Israel secretly wanted complete control of the flow of water in the region, despite its commitments to the Americans. Consequently, a dispute ensued over the control of Palestinian territory near Banat Ya�qub.

Unaware of Israel�s hidden agenda, UN Representative, Dr. Ralph Bunche, worked out a truce agreement where disputed lands would be evacuated by Syrian forces. The agreement stipulated that Israel must allow Arab inhabitants to continue farming there. Israel also agreed that it would not occupy the disputed area, but would allow it to be a neutral zone.

Immediately after the Syrian troops withdrew, the Israelis broke their promise and drove the Palestinian farmers from the land. The Syrian troops responded by opening fire to drive out the settlers. Israel responded by complaining that the Syrians had violated the truce and asserted a right to occupy the areas. UN Truce Observers immediately cited Israel as the instigator and essentially stated that the Syrian troops were justified in retaliating against Israel for violating the truce agreement.

The Israelis took the strategy that if they completed the water diversion project at Banat Ya�qub, then the UN would back down because the work simply could not be undone. So the Israelis began working aggressively on the project. They worked non‑stop, twenty‑four hours a day using searchlights at night to hasten completion. But secrecy was still key. They omitted appropriations for the project from their published budget. In addition, they did not mention it to Americans working with them on other water projects; however, US intelligence soon detected their activity.

President Eisenhower and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles realized that Israel had openly deceived them and had no intention of keeping its earlier promise to cooperate in the American‑sponsored regional water‑usage plan. To show its displeasure, the Eisenhower administration withheld $26 million under the Mutual Security Act and suspended economic aid until Israel agreed to cooperate with UN observers.

In addition, President Eisenhower directed the Treasury to prepare an Executive Order removing tax‑deductible status from contributions by Jewish Americans to such Zionist organizations as the United Jewish Appeal (UJA). Eisenhower did not make these actions public because he did not want to humiliate the Israelis; however, the Israelis interpreted his magnanimous gesture as a sign of weakness. As a result, they continued work on the project; convinced that the Americans would back down. Israel�s strategy might have worked had Israel not launched a bloody raid on the village of Kibya on the night of October 14, 1953. In that attack, twenty‑five‑ year‑old Ariel Sharon and his three hundred Israeli commandos, known as Force 101, massacred fifty‑three Palestinian civilians. According to a UN report, Sharon�s forces drove the villagers into their homes then blew them up.

The Eisenhower administration condemned the raid and, for the first time, publicly revealed that it had already suspended construction funds for Israel�s water supply. Their was a huge backlash against Eisenhower. The US government was denounced by Hadassah, a Jewish charitable organization. An attach� at the Israeli Embassy attempted to divert attention from the water controversy by claiming; in a widely publicized speech, that the Kibya raid was in response to Jordanian aggression. Pro‑Israeli congressmen and David Ben‑Gurion accused Eisenhower and his advisers of anti‑Semitism.

But Eisenhower stood firm and continued to withhold funds from Israel. Fearing a financial burden, Israeli representatives informed President Eisenhower; on October 19, that work had ceased on the water diversion project and that Israel would cooperate with the Security Counsil�s efforts to solve the Jordan River Development problem. Within twenty‑four hours, America restored aid to Israel.

Eisenhower demonstrated that Israel responded faster to cutting off the money flow than anything else; however, the Israelis interpreted America�s quick restoration of aid as proof that they could manipulate the superpower by applying adequate pressure. Ultimately, Israel completed the project in a slightly altered manner.1)

�� Nov. 1956: The Suez Crisis

The stage was set for the Suez Crisis in 1955 when the Eisenhower administration began pressuring Israel to demonstrate its commitment to peace in the Middle East.

On February 28, 1955, President Gamal Adbel Nasser made a speech full of warnings against Israeli atrocities. He emphasized a bloody raid on the Gaza Strip by the Israelis, allegedly a retaliation for raids made from Gaza. Nasser was also upset with the United States for denying his request for arms a few months earlier. In his speech he repeated the request for Egypt to buy arms but was ignored.

On September 4, 1955, Egypt announced that it had received a proposal from the Soviet Union for an arms sale. The Eisenhower administration treated this as an idle threat which angered Nasser. As a result, he brokered a cotton‑for‑arms barter agreement with Czechoslovakia on September 27 in which Egypt received $200 million worth of arms; tanks, MiG planes, artillery, submarines, and small arms.

Israel immediately renewed its joint arms agreement with the United States, France, and Britain. In addition, Israel requested a treaty guaranteeing its security, but it was denied by the Western powers because they knew that Israel�s military strength was vastly superior to the neighboring Arab nations.

On August 26, 1955, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles made a speech before the Council of Foreign Relations in New York in which he outlined terms for peace in the Middle East. He stated that the problem of Palestinian refugees could be solved, but Israel should not be expected to assume the full cost. He proposed that Congress approve an international loan to finance the resettlement or repatriating of Palestinian refugees. The loan would also help develop irrigation projects to assist refugees in cultivating their land for growing crops.

The Israelis were somewhat agitated by Dulles�s speech because he mentioned a possible boundary revision. Dulles promptly responded to clarify the American position. He stated in no uncertain terms that if Sharett and Ben‑Gurion (Israeli leaders) wanted American diplomatic, political, and military aid, they would have to demonstrate their peaceful intentions by helping resolve the sensitive problems of Palestinian refugees and boundary disputes. On November 9, President Eisenhower; who was in a Denver hospital convalescing from a heart attack, confirmed Dulles�s position in a formal statement made from his hospital bed.2)

At that point, it became clear that the United States could no longer be counted on to support Israel�s continuing efforts to expand its borders. Consequently, Israel turned to the European powers for support. Over the next year, trouble began to arise over the Suez Canal.

The Suez Canal is a sea‑level waterway running north‑south across the Isthmus of Suez in Egypt to connect the Mediterranean and the Red seas. The canal separates the African continent from Asia, and it provides the shortest seagoing route between Europe and the lands lying around the Indian and western Pacific oceans. It is one of the world's most heavily used shipping lanes.3)

On July 26, 1956, Egyptian President Nasser angered Israel and the European powers when he nationalized the Suez Canal. He took this bold action because he felt that friends of Israel in America had cheated him out of US aide for the Aswan Dam that Egypt needed for irrigation and power. The dam cost $1.3 billion and Nasser had been given the impression by the Eisenhower administration that US aide would be forthcoming; however, friends of Israel in America pressured the Senate Appropriations Committee into blocking funding for the dam.

On July 16, 1956, funding was officially denied; much to the chagrin of President Eisenhower and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles. To make matters worse, the State Department issued a statement, on July 19, critically appraising Egypt�s international credit. Nasser felt that this was a ruse created by friends of Israel in America, and he responded by seizing control of the canal and nationalizing the Suez Canal Company in order to obtain funds for the dam.4)

On October 29, 1956, Israel attacked Egypt and advanced toward the Suez Canal. On November 1, British and French forces also invaded Egypt and began occupation of the canal zone, but growing opposition from President Eisenhower, Secretary of State Dulles, UN Secretary‑General Dag Hammarskj�ld, and Soviet threats of intervention put an immediate stop to British and French support, but Israeli troops still occupied the Gulf of Aqaba and the Gaza Strip in defiance of a UN resolution.5) Eisenhower was so angered by European involvement in the attack that he telephoned British Prime Minister Anthony Eden and gave him such a tongue‑lashing that the Prime Minister was reduced to tears.6) (Footnote 24)

Eisenhower told Dulles: "Foster, you tell�em, goddamn it, we�re going to apply sanctions, we�re going to the United Nations, we�re going to do everything that there is to stop this thing." He later explained, "We just told the Israelis it was absolutely indefensible and that if they expect our support in the Middle East and in maintaining their position, they had better behave�We went to town right away to give them hell."

UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskj�ld shared Eisenhower�s view that Israel needed to learn to behave. Consequently, Hammarskj�ld and Ben‑Gurion engaged in some heated exchanges after the UN Secretary General publicly condemned Israel for its retaliatory actions against Palestinians. In 1956 Ben‑Gurion complained that Hammarskj�ld�s remarks had encouraged assaults on Israel by Egypt and Jordan. Hammarskj�ld replied as follows:

You are convinced that the threat of retaliation has a deterrent effect. I am convinced that it is more of an incitement to individual members of the Arab forces than even what has been said by their own governments. You are convinced that acts of retaliation will stop further incidents. I am convinced that they will lead to further incidents�.You believe that this way of creating respect for Israel will pave the way for sound coexistence with the Arab people. I believe that the policy may postpone indefinitely the time for such coexistence�I think the discussion of this question can be considered closed since you, in spite of previous discouraging experiences, have taken the responsibility of large‑scale tests of the correctness of your belief.7)

On February 2, 1957, the UN General Assembly passed a resolution demanding Israel�s withdrawal from the Gulf of Aqaba and the Gaza Strip, but Ben‑Gurion refused. Fed up with Israel�s treachery, Eisenhower wrote a strong letter to Ben‑Gurion demanding Israel�s withdrawal. Still Ben‑Gurion refused.8)

�� Feburary 1957:

�� LBJ Rescued Israel From UN Sanctions

It had been rumored that UN Secretary‑General Dag Hammarskj�ld of Sweden was quietly pushing for sanctions; with the full support of the Eisenhower administration, against Israel if it continued to maintain troops in the Gulf of Aqaba and Gaza in defiance of US and UN demands for immediate withdrawal. In response, Lyndon Johnson; then Senate Majority Leader, wrote a letter to Secretary of State John Foster Dulles urging the Eisenhower Administration not to support UN sanctions against Israel. Johnson�s letter to Dulles appeared in the New York Times on February 20, 1957. The Senate Majority Leader�s argument was that it was an unfair double‑standard to punish a small country like Israel when large countries like the Soviet Union were allowed to openly defy UN resolutions without being punished.9)

In addition, Johnson rallied Senate Democrats to oppose Israel sanctions.(Footnote 25) He used partisan politics to pressure Eisenhower into retreating from principle, but Eisenhower stood his ground and kept applying pressure to Israel by cutting off or delaying financial assistance. When Israel began to run out of money, in March 1957, Prime Minister David Ben‑Gurion finally agreed to withdraw troops from the occupied territories. President Eisenhower triumphed, but Johnson had protected Israel from the humiliation of UN sanctions. Sadly, Eisenhower was the last US president to stand up to the Israeli government and it�s American supporters. At least he proved it could be done.10)

Ironically, one of the best accounts of Lyndon Johnson�s involvement in the Suez Crisis was written by Louis Bloomfield in his 1957 book entitled Egypt, Israel and the Gulf of Aqaba. In the ensuing years, Johnson�s involvement in that conflict has been erased from history. Although his pro‑Israel stance appeared on the front page of the New York Times on February 20, 1957, his name is not mentioned in Western history books about the Suez Crisis (none that I have found anyway, except Bloomfield�s). The power elite within the book publishing industry have apparently been concealing Johnson�s loyalty to Israel as a means of preventing inquiries by historians, researchers, and investigators about a possible Jewish conspiracy behind the assassination of President Kennedy years later.

This is how Bloomfield described Johnson�s pro‑Israel stance during the Suez/Gulf of Aqaba Crisis:

�On February 11^th, 1957, Mr. John Foster Dulles, United States Secretary of State, submitted certain Proposals to the Israeli Government which were, in effect, that:

"Israel should withdraw her troops from the Gulf of Aqaba region and the Gaza Strip, in accordance with the recommendations of the United Nations General Assembly.

�The United States should use all its influence to establish the Strait of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba as an international waterway for the innocent passage of all nations, including Israel.

�Meanwhile the United States should do everything it could to see that United Nations troops replaced the Israeli troops in the Gaza Strip and that that area should become a kind of de facto United Nations trusteeship where United Nations officials would watch and if possible stop any fighting between Israel and Egypt.

�Subsequent discussion between the United States Secretary of State and Mr. Abba Eban did not bring about the withdrawal of the Israeli forces from these two areas and rumours began to circulate in the American press that the Afro‑Asian bloc would introduce resolutions calling for economic and military sanctions to force Israel to comply with the withdrawal resolutions.

On February 19^th, 1957, Senator Lyndon B. Johnson, the Senate Majority Leader, wrote to Mr. John Foster Dulles urging that the United States oppose imposing of economic sanctions against Israel by the United Nations. The letter was endorsed by the Senate Democratic Policy Committee.� (Louis Bloomfield, Egypt, Israel, and the Gulf of Aqaba, p. 152)

�� July 2, 1957: Senator Kennedy

�� Made a Controversial Speech About Algeria

On July 2, 1957, John F. Kennedy; then a US Senator, made a speech, "Facing Facts on Algeria," which denounced France�s colonial occupation of Algeria and the brutality of the French‑Algerian War. The speech also demonstrated an understanding of Indochina that would likely have prevented him from escalating US military involvement in Vietnam had he not been killed.

Historian Richard Mahoney summarized the speech and events that preceded and followed it:

�Early in 1957, Kennedy decided to make a major critique of the [Eisenhower] administration�s position on France�s colonial war in Algeria. By 1957, the French had committed over 500,000 troops to the effort to suppress the nationalist rebellion. Torture, atrocity, and terror on both sides had turned the pride of France�s empire into a chamber of horrors�the Eisenhower administration had been maintaining a policy of strict silence in Algeria � at least until Kennedy�s attack, which The New York Times called "the most comprehensive and outspoken arraignment of Western policy toward Algeria yet presented by an American in public office.

On July 2, 1957, Kennedy accused the Eisenhower administration of courting disaster in Algeria. He charged that Eisenhower�s policy of non‑involvement in Africa and Asia was really made up of �tepid encouragement and moralizations to both sides, cautious neutrality on all the real issues, and a restatement of our obvious dependence upon our European friends, and our obvious dedication nevertheless to the principles of self‑determination, and our obvious desire not to become involved.� The result, Kennedy said, was that, �We have deceived ourselves into believing that we have thus pleased both sides and displeased no one�when, in truth, we have earned the suspicion of all.�

�The previous decade had proven that the tide of nationalism in the Third World � from Indochina to India to Indonesia � was �irresistible,� Kennedy declared. It was time for France to face the fact that Algeria had to be freed. When would the West learn, he asked, that colonies �are like fruit that cling to the tree only till they ripen?� Didn�t the French debacle in Indochina, which ended at Dien Bien Phu, serve as a warning of what lay ahead for France in Algeria if something were not done? (Referring to lessons that should have been learned from France�s Indochina debacle, Kennedy stated,)

"Did that tragic episode not teach us whether France likes it or not, admits it or not, or has our support or not, that their overseas territories are sooner or later, one by one, going to break free and look with suspicion on the Western nations who impeded their steps to independence?�Nationalism in Africa cannot be evaluated purely in terms of the historical and legal niceties argued by the French and thus far accepted by the State Department. National self‑identification frequently takes place by quick combustion which the rain of repression simply cannot extinguish.

�In the United States, a storm of protest greeted Kennedy�s address on �Facing Facts on Algeria.� President Eisenhower complained about �young men getting up and shouting about things.� Secretary [of State John Foster] Dulles commented acidly that if the senator wanted to tilt against colonialism, perhaps he might concentrate on the communist variety. Most prominent Democrats were equally scornful. Adlai Stevenson dismissed Kennedy�s speech as .terrible.� Dean Acheson described the speech as "foolish words that wound�a dispirited ally.

�In France, the speech provoked an even more furious outcry. Paris�s largest daily, �Le Figaro,� remarked: �It is shameful that our business is so badly directed that we are forced to endure such idiocies.� U.S. News and World Report noted that �An American has unified France � against himself!� Responding to Kennedy�s speech, French President Rene Coty told the French Senate that France would �never negotiate with cutthroats since independence would give the 1,200,000 Europeans living in Algeria one alternative � leaving their homeland or living at the mercy of fanaticism.� French Defense Minister Andre Morice publicly wondered whether Kennedy was �having nightmares.� Talk of independence, Morice said, �will cost many more innocent lives,� Harvard historian Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. reported to Kennedy from Paris that summer that "Algeria is beginning to poison France.

�In Algeria itself, feeling among the European colonists against the speech ran so high that French authorities warned American newsmen and residents to stay off the streets to avoid reprisals. Two days after the speech a bomb exploded outside the American consulate in Algiers. The French Resident Minister in Algiers, Robert Lacoste, called the bomb �a Communist joke� and challenged Kennedy to come to Algeria. The senator declined...

�Practically no one in the American foreign‑policy establishment regarded the Algeria speech as anything more than a partisan political blast designed to attract attention. But foreign correspondents such as Alistair Cooke of the Manchester Guardian and Henri Pierre of Le Monde recognized what their American counterparts had not � that Kennedy knew what he was talking about on Third World issues. In a letter to the editor of The New York Times, Pierre wrote: �Strangely enough, as a Frenchman I feel that on the whole Mr. Kennedy is more to be commended than blamed for his forthright, frank and provocative speech.�

Although Le Monde opposed Kennedy�s call for Algerian independence, it identified the senator as one of the few serious students of history in American politics: �The most striking point of the speech of Mr. Kennedy is the important documentation it revealed and his thorough knowledge of the French milieu.�" (Richard Mahoney, JFK: Ordeal in Africa, pp. 19‑22)

�� Kennedy, Eisenhower, and Algeria

In his 1957 speech about Algeria, "Senator" Kennedy was highly critical of the Eisenhower administration; however, the political dynamic involved must be considered. Kennedy�s views about Israel and the Middle East in general were closer to Eisenhower�s than Johnson�s. Having stated that, it is significant to understand that Kennedy�s public endorsement of an independent Algeria was a subtle criticism of Israel. It is widely known that Israel opposed Algeria�s independence because it (Israel) wanted to oppress or dominate all Muslim/Arab states.

Although Eisenhower had not publicly supported Algerian independence, it seems plausible that he may have agreed with Kennedy but lacked the political courage to denounce France as the young Senator had boldly done in his speech. Upon reflection, Eisenhower may have secretly admired Kennedy for publicly denouncing America�s World War II ally. After all, France had recently betrayed Eisenhower by secretly conniving with Israel and Britain to attack Egypt after President Nasser had nationalized the Suez Canal. (Footnote 26)

Kennedy surely understood how much he and Eisenhower agreed on Middle Eastern issues, but Eisenhower belonged to the opposing political party; and Kennedy and Johnson both had their eyes on the White House in the upcoming 1960 presidential campaign. Consequently, one of Kennedy�s objectives when making the Algerian speech was likely to differentiate himself from the sitting Republican President and his Democratic adversary, Johnson. Although Kennedy and Johnson held opposing views about Israel, they could not openly criticize each other because they were both Democrats. But since Eisenhower was a Republican, it made sense politically for a Democratic Senator to criticize him for not supporting Algerian independence. The speech also sent a message to informed political observers that unlike Johnson, Kennedy would not be a minion for Israel if elected president.

Even more important, Kennedy�s Algerian speech made the front page of the New York Times which put him in the same league as Senate Majority Leader Johnson. Recall that Johnson had made the front page of the New York Times five months earlier (Feb. 1957) for opposing Eisenhower�s efforts to place UN sanctions on Israel in the wake of that country�s failed attempt to seize land from Egypt and overthrow Nasser in the Suez Crisis of 1956 and 57.

�� June 5, 1967: The Six Day War

Ten years after the Suez Crisis, Israel attacked Egypt again; but this time with success. The event is known as the Six Day War which began on June 5, 1967. Things had changed a great deal over the ten years leading up to the Six Day War. Israel�s most influential adversaries had either died or left public office. Eisenhower had retired years earlier and was in failing health. John Foster Dulles had died of cancer in 1959. Dag Hammarskj�ld had been killed in a mysterious plane crash in the Congolese province of Katanga in 1961. President Kennedy of course had been assassinated in Dallas in 1963.

And Israel�s old ally, Lyndon Johnson, had become Commander‑in‑Chief of the United States. In July of 1965, President Johnson had appointed Supreme Court Justice Arthur Goldberg as US ambassador to the UN. Goldberg�a Jew and ardent supporter of Israel�replaced Adlai Stevenson as US delegate to the UN after Stevenson died suddenly of a heart attack on July 14, 1965. (Footnote 27) The Yemen War had been eroding Arab unity since the conflict began in 1962.(Footnote 28) By 1967, Egyptian forces had suffered heavy losses and were weakened after five years of military involvement in the Yemen War.

Whether these events were random or planned is anyone�s guess, but they were definitely advantageous to Israel by the time the Six Day War occurred in 1967.

The Six Day War was a watershed event that transformed Israel from a small nation into a colonial empire. Although Israel became a nation in 1948, it expanded dramatically after the Six Day War. Israel took from the Arabs; through military force, the Old City of Jerusalem, the Sinai and the Gaza Strip, the Jordanian territory west of the Jordan River known as the West Bank, and the Golan Heights, on the Israeli‑Syrian border.11) In addition to acquiring new land, Israel gained control of an additional 900,000 Arabs who became the discontented subjects of the new Israeli empire. Since 1967, the number of Arabs under Israel�s military control has grown to over 1.75 million.12)

Amnesty International has documented Israel�s inhumane treatment of its Palestinian subjects citing arbitrary arrests, torturing detainees, destroying or sealing the homes of Arab suspects and their relatives, confiscating land, destroying crops, and diverting precious water from thirsty Palestinians in the desert to fill the swimming pools and water the lawns of Israeli settlers.13) This conduct is condoned, embraced, and encouraged by the United States through its steadfast financial and military support of Israel. Today, US tax payers spend approximately $3 billion annually to subsidize, support, and arm Israel. Although Israel is a wealthy country by western standards, it receives the highest amount of American foreign aid money, 28 percent.14)

Jewish scholars Michael Kazin and Maurice Isserman described in their book, America Divided: The Civil War of the 1960s, the passion ignited within American Jews by the Six Day War. They wrote the following:

�The swift, complete victory was followed by a long and wrenching occupation of Palestinian lands. For many American Jews, the 1967 conflict awakened and inspired passions that did much to transform the meaning of their identity. No longer was Israel just a reason for Jewish pride, a desert miracle of orange groves and thriving kibbutzes, whose creation was romanticized in Exodus‑a popular novel and film of the late '50s and early '60s. Israel was now the homeland of fellow Jews who had fought alone for their survival and were resigned to living in perpetual danger.

The threat came not just from Arab militants but from communist powers, their Third World allies, and a good many American leftists who were eager to prove their �anti‑imperialist� credentials. In the face of extinction, Israel became �the ultimate reality in the life of every Jew living today,� as a young professor at Brandeis University put it, �In dealing with those who oppose Israel, we are not reasonable and we are not rational. Nor should we be.�"15)

Those are troubling words, but they reflect the true agenda of those who support the Jewish state of Israel.

�� Background on the Six Day War

Understanding the Six Day War requires some background regarding the politics of the Middle East in 1967. The following men were heads of state for the countries involved in the Six Day War:

Nation�� Head of State

Egypt�� President Gamal Abdel Nasser

Sryia�� General Salah al‑Jadid

Jordan�� King Hussein [ibn Talal]

Israel�� Prime Minister Levi Eshkol

US�� President Lyndon Baines Johnson

USSR�� Chairman Aleksey Nikolayevich Kosygin

UN�� Secretary General U Thant (of Burma,�� now Myanmar)

Egyptian President Nasser was a key figure in Middle Eastern affairs for seventeen years. In 1954 he became prime minister of Egypt, and in 1956 he became that country�s president�remaining in that position until his sudden death in 1970.16) Nasser had been Israel�s primary enemy because he was a charismatic Muslim leader who advocated Arab unity (also known as pan‑Arabism).

Egypt has no oil of any consequence, but it has a more advanced culture than the other oil‑producing Arab nations. It was the home of one of the principal civilizations of the ancient Middle East. It is also one of the earliest urban and literate societies.17) Consequently, the other Arab nations have historically looked to Egypt for leadership.

The original antagonist of Israel in the Six Day War was Syria, led by General Salah al‑Jadid, head of the Ba�th regime.18) Although Syria; under the Ba�th regime, was an aggressive enemy of Israel, Syria�s erratic behavior toward other Arab nations actually helped Israel. In fact, Israel used Syrian raids along the its border as a pretext for attacking Egypt and starting the Six Day War.

In March 1963 Ba�thist supporters seized power from the "secessionist" regime in a military coup. With the Ba�th in power, Nasser had three Arab nations against him. Those nations were Saudi Arabia and Jordan (because they supported the ousted Imam in the Yemen war) and Syria.

In April 1967 Syrian bombardments of Israeli villages had been intensified. When the Israeli Air Force shot down six Syrian MiG planes in reprisal, Egypt mobilized its forces near the Sinai border.19) Egypt had a mutual defense agreement with the Syrians, who now felt themselves in danger. As an advocate of pan‑Arabism, Nasser felt obliged to help Syria. He ordered part of the Egyptian Army to move into Sinai. He thought that the presence of Egyptian forces would discourage the Israelis from attacking Syria. It was a purely defensive move designed to draw off Israeli forces from Syria. If Israel had attacked Syria, then the Egyptian Army would have carried out operations in support of the Syrians. But no offensive operations against Israel were consider.20)

A standoff between Egypt and Israel ensued, and tensions mounted between the superpowers. The Soviet Union supported Egypt and the United States supported Israel. This raced the stakes considerably because it introduced the possibility of nuclear war.21)

Historians now know that Israel secretly launched an attack against Egypt, but lied about it claiming that Nasser had launched the attack first. In fact Israeli Prime Minister Menachem

Begin made this admission in a speech on August 8, 1982 before the National Defense College in Jerusalem. He stated that the Six Day War was not a "war of necessity" but rather a "war of choice�Nasser did not attack us. We decided to attack him."22) This was a major admission by Begin.

On June 3, 1967, just two days before the Israelis attacked, the United States sent the aircraft carrier Intrepid through the Suez Canal with all its planes lined up on deck. Nasser thought this was an unnecessary show of force. The Egyptian people became furious. They lined the bank of the Canal and threw old shoes at the carrier. At the same time the Sixth Fleet flexed its muscles and prepared for a war situation. It was an excessive show of force by the United States.23)

After Israel�s victory, Nasser was disgusted with Johnson. He felt that Johnson was dishonest and had colluded with Israel to strike first and blame it on Egypt. He was suspicious of America�s UN ambassador Arthur Goldberg, an ardent Zionist. Goldberg had immediately backed Israel in the UN when it claimed that Egypt "fired the first shot." Nasser accused Johnson of collusion, broke off diplomatic relations with the United States, and ordered all Americans out of Egypt. Several other Arab states did the same. Soon Johnson, already angered by the charge of collusion, had to watch the humiliating spectacle of twenty‑four thousand American men, women, and children being thrown out of the Middle East. Johnson never forgot and never forgave.24)

After Egypt�s humiliating defeat in the Six Day War, Nasser attempted to resign, but massive street demonstrations and a vote of confidence by the National Assembly induced him to remain in office. The Soviet Union immediately began replacing all the destroyed war equipment and installed surface‑to‑air missiles along the Suez as a cover for Egypt�s artillery installations.25)

An important footnote to the Six Day War is an incident that occurred in Yemen months earlier. In early 1967, fighting in Yemen still continued. One day there was shooting in Taiz (in Yemen). Direction finders indicated that two bazooka shots came from the headquarters of the United States Point Four Aid Program; which was the CIA's cover organization. Yemeni government forces attacked the building and arrested the four people inside. The safes were opened and an enormous number of documents were found and subsequently photographed by Egyptian intelligence experts.(Footnote 29) The United States was furious at the attack on the building and demanded the documents. They were returned three weeks later, but by that time their secrets were known. Many people within the United States military became extremely hostile toward Nasser because of this event. Some believe the Six Day War was a form of retribution.26)

�� UN Resolution 242

Within six months after the Six Day War, the UN Security Council issued Resolution 242 which called for "withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict." In theory the UN should enforce the resolution itself, but unfortunately, reality is much different. The sad truth is the UN is unable to enforce much of anything without the support of the United States, and the United States has maintained a "passionate attachment" to Israel ever since President Johnson was in office.

Ironically, Resolution 242 was issued on the fourth anniversary of President Kennedy�s death, November 22, 1967.27) It is an extremely important document because virtually all disputes between Israel and the Palestinians and neighboring Arab states could be resolved by its enforcement.

In addition, the Israelis managed to secure ambiguous, legalistic wording for Resolution 242 which makes even more difficult to enforce;28) however, the resolution remains a highly sensitive area for American presidents and politicians to roam. The following is the entire text of the resolution:

�The Security Council, Expressing its continuing concern with the grave situation in the Middle East, Emphasizing the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war and the need to work for a just and lasting peace in which every State in the area can live in security,

�Emphasizing further that all Member States in their acceptance of the Charter of the United Nations have undertaken a commitment to act in accordance with Article 2 of the Charter,

1). Affirms that the fulfillment of Charter principles requires the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East which should include the application of both the following principles:

(i) Withdrawal of Israel armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict;

(ii) Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgment of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force;

2). Affirms further the necessity

(a) For guaranteeing freedom of navigation through international waterways in the area;

(b) For achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem;

(c) For guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political independence of every State in the area, through measures including the establishment of demilitarized zones;

3). Requests the Secretary‑General to designate a Special Representative to proceed to the Middle East to establish and maintain contacts with the States concerned in order to promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in accordance with the provisions and principles in this resolution;

4). Requests the Secretary‑General to report to the Security Council on the progress of the efforts of the Special Representative as soon as possible.� (UN Security Council Resolution 242 of November 22, 1967)

�� June 8, 1967: Israel Attacked the USS Liberty

In the midst of the Six Day War, Israel attacked the USS Liberty spy vessel killing 34 American sailors and wounding 75.

George Ball wrote a riveting account of Israel�s attack on the USS Liberty on June 8, 1967. Ball�s comments are significant because he was undersecretary of state in the Johnson and Kennedy administrations. The following text is an excerpt from Ball�s book, The Passionate Attachment: America�s Involvement With Israel, 1947 to the Present:

�During the [Six Day] War, Israel attacked the USS Liberty. The Liberty was an American intelligence‑ gathering vessel, then cruising in international waters near Egypt and reading the radio transmissions on both sides. It flew the American flag and was painted in US Navy colors, complete with number and name.

�On the fourth day of the war [June 8, 1967], with both Jordan and Egypt routed, the Israelis turned their attention to Syria, the original cause of all this trouble. Guns mounted on the Golan Heights had subjected Galilee to sporadic bombardment for years and the Israelis had every intention of capturing those Heights before hostilities were over. Meanwhile, the United Nations had adopted a cease‑fire resolution and they feared there might not be enough time to accomplish this objective without, as it were, going into overnight.

�The Liberty�s presence and function were known to Israeli leaders. They presumably thought it vital that the Liberty be prevented from informing Washington of their intentions to violate any cease‑fire before they had completed their occupation of the Golan. Their solution was brutal and direct.

�Israel aircraft determined the exact location of the ship and undertook a combined air‑naval attack. Apprised of Israel�s plans from various sources, the US Navy Department faced a delicate problem. Due regard for the lives of America�s naval personnel should have impelled the Navy to urge the State Department to warn off Israel in no uncertain terms; meanwhile, the Navy have alerted the Liberty to its danger and dispatched ships or planes for its protection. But none of these actions was taken in time.

�There has, for years, been a continuing argument about the tragic lapse. Some say that a warning to Israel might have exposed U.S. sources of secret intelligence. Whatever the motive, the President or one of his aides took the decision to risk the ship and its crew, and merely ordered them, without explanation, to steam west at top speed. Unhappily, that notice was too little and taken too late. Israeli ships and planes attacked, killing 34 American sailors, wounding 75, and leaving 821 rocket and machine‑gun holes in the Liberty. It was only when the Israelis were preparing to board the ship that American planes belatedly appeared from the west and forced them to retire.

�The sequel was unedifying. The [Johnson] administration tried vigorously to downplay the whole matter. Although it silenced the crew, casualties to the sailors and damage to the ship could not possibly be concealed. Thus, an elaborate charade was performed. The United States complained pro forma to Israel, which reacted by blaming the victims. The ship, they rejoined, had not been clearly marked but looked like an Arab ship; which was definitely untrue. Nor did the Israelis even pretend that they had queried the American Embassy in Tel Aviv regarding the status of the well‑marked ship. In the end, the Israelis tendered a reluctant and graceless apology; indemnities for the victims and damaged ship were both parsimonious and slow in coming. The sordid affair has still not been erased from the history books; an organization of devoted survivors has kept the cause alive over the years by publishing a newsletter and holding well‑advertised meetings.

�� Yet the ultimate lesson of the Liberty attack had far more effect on policy

�� in Israel than America. Israel�s leaders concluded that nothing they

�� might do would offend the Americans to the point of reprisal. If

�� America�s leaders did not have the courage to punish Israel for the

�� blatant murder of American citizens, it seemed that their American

�� friends would let them get away with almost anything.

�� (George Ball, The Passionate Attachment, pp. 57 ‑ 58)

Arthur Goldberg, UN Point Man

As previously stated, Adlai Stevenson died suddenly of a heart attack on July 14, 1965.29 Until his untimely death, Stevenson

had represented the United States in the UN. Arthur Goldberg was a Supreme Court Justice appointed by Kennedy to a

traditionally Jewish slot in the high court.(Footnote 30) At President Johnson�s request, Goldberg resigned from his position as

Supreme Court justice to take the lower position of US ambassador to the UN.30 This was an extraordinary move.

Goldberg was an interesting figure. In addition to serving on the Supreme Court and as a UN diplomat, he had an impressive

background in the world of espionage. During World War II, he worked with Haganah and OSS in Palestine.

After the events of Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, President Roosevelt created the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), a

military spy agency and precursor to the CIA.31 New York attorney William Donovan was appointed to run the newly formed

agency. With Donovan in charge of the OSS, Roosevelt had created the first civilian‑run spy organization in modern US

history. Donovan immediately recruited another New York attorney, Allen Dulles, to help establish the organization. Goldberg

was given the rank of major and he assisted Donovan and Dulles establish an OSS field office in New York. Shortly thereafter,

Goldberg became�for all intents and purposes�an international spy working for the OSS. He was assigned various spy

missions in Sweden, Germany, Spain, and Morocco.32

With the experience he acquired in espionage, he returned to Washington, DC and created an intelligence gathering operation.

After that, he was sent on a secret mission in Palestine where he met with leaders of the illegal army of Jewish settlers,

Haganah. This operation meant a great deal to Goldberg personally because he had become a Zionist rather late in life. The

Haganah worked with him to coordinate a joint OSS‑Haganah parachute mission into Italy to gather critical intelligence

information. After the Palestine encounter, Goldberg was sent to London to recruit anti‑Nazi Germans, who had been captured

as spies when the allies invaded France.33

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Endnotes

�� 1.George Ball, The Passionate Attachment, pp. 43 ‑ 45

�� 2.ibid, pp. 45 ‑ 46

�� 3.Encyclopedia Britannica: Suez Canal

�� 4.George Ball, The Passionate Attachment, p. 46

�� 5.Encyclopedia Britannica: Suez Crisis

�� 6.Richard D. Mahoney, JFK: Ordeal in Africa, Chapter 1

� 7.George Ball, The Passionate Attachment, p. 251. Eisenhower�s instructions to Dulles were on p. 47 of Ball�s book. The Hammarskj�ld

�� quote regarding Ben‑Gurion and Israel was on p. 251. Ball cited Brian Urquhart�s biography of Dag Hammarskj�ld: Hammarskj�ld, p.

�� 157.

�� 8.George Ball, The Passionate Attachment, p. 47

�� 9.George Ball, The Passionate Attachment, pp. 46 ‑ 49; multiple articles about Senate Majority Leader Johnson�s support for Israel in the

�� New York Times on February 20, 1957

� 10.ibid

� 11.Encyclopedia Britannica: Six Day War

� 12.George Ball, The Passionate Attachment, p. 58

� 13.ibid, p. 179

� 14.George Ball, The Passionate Attachment, p. 256

� 15.Kazin and Isserman, America Divided, p. 253

� 16.Encyclopedia Britannica: Gamal Abdel Nasser

� 17.Encyclopedia Britannica: Egypt

� 18.Encyclopedia Britannica: Six Day War; Salah al‑Jadid; George Ball, The Passionate Attachment, pp. 53‑56; Mohamed Heikal, The Cairo

�� Documents, Chapter VII: Johnson and Violence, pp. 225 ‑ 249

� 19.Encyclopedia Britannica: Six Day War

� 20.Mohamed Heikal, The Cairo Documents, Chapter VII: Johnson and Violence, pp. 225 ‑ 249

� 21.ibid

� 22.Ball, p 56

� 23.Heikal

� 24.ibid

� 25.Encyclopedia Britannica: Gamal Abdel Nasser

� 26.Heikal

� 27.George Ball, The Passionate Attachment, p. 62

� 28.ibid, pp. 62‑63

� 29.Encyclopedia Britannica: Adlai Stevenson

� 30.ibid, Arthur Goldberg

� 31.Edward B. Shils, Ph.D, Monthly Labor Review (January 1997), pp. 59 ‑ 60 (excerpt from Arthur Goldberg: proof of the American dream)

� 32.ibid

� 33.ibid

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Chapter 10: LBJ�s "Passionate Attachment" to Israel

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Background

As some readers may know, the term "passionate attachment" was used by George Washington in his farewell address in

1796. Washington advised citizens of the new republic to renounce any "passionate attachment"(Footnote 23) with another

nation, and also to repudiate "inveterate hatred" toward another country. In the Twentieth Century, the United States failed to

heed Washington�s warnings on both counts. Shortly after World War II, we developed an "inveterate hatred" of the Soviet

Union and formed a "passionate attachment" to Israel, although the latter accelerated dramatically under the Johnson

Administration.

President Dwight D. Eisenhower was the last American president in the Twentieth Century to successfully stand up to the

pressures and unyielding annoyances of the Israeli government and its American supporters. Although President Kennedy

shared his predecessor�s views intellectually, he entered the White House after an extremely close election. Consequently, he

had to assume a more cautious approach.

The Eisenhower administration�s Middle East policy is important for two reasons. First of all, it demonstrated that a strong

American president can stand up to Israel. Secondly, it reveals that Lyndon Johnson�then Senate Majority Leader�was

Eisenhower�s most influential political adversary regarding Israel.

Two major incidents occurred on Eisenhower�s watch where Israel acted as an aggressor toward its neighbors and toward

Palestinians living in the region. The first incident occurred in 1953 and involved Israel�s effort to secretly divert waters of the

Jordan. The second incident occurred in 1957 when Israel conspired with France and Britain to attack Egypt and overthrow

that country�s leader, President Gamal Abdel Nasser, after he nationalized the Suez Canal in defiance of Israel and the Western

powers. In the latter incident, Lyndon Johnson used all of his political muscle as Senate Majority Leader to prevent the UN

from imposing sanctions on Israel�the sanctions were fully supported by the Eisenhower administration�for its flagrant

disregard for international law. In both instances, Eisenhower forced Israel to behave by temporarily cutting off American aid.

1953: The Jordan River Diversion

Israel secretly planned to use the Palestinian village of Banat Ya�qub for a major water diversion project that would move

waters of the Jordan Valley to central Israel and the North Negev. The UN, the US, and the Palestinians who lived in that area

were unaware of Israel�s plans. Earlier, the Eisenhower administration had offered to implement an American‑sponsored

regional water‑usage plan, and Israel had promised to cooperate in that effort. But in reality, Israel secretly wanted complete

control of the flow of water in the region, despite its commitments to the Americans. Consequently, a dispute ensued over the

control of Palestinian territory near Banat Ya�qub.

Unaware of Israel�s hidden agenda, UN Representative, Dr. Ralph Bunche, worked out a truce agreement where disputed

lands would be evacuated by Syrian forces. The agreement stipulated that Israel must allow Arab inhabitants to continue

farming there. Israel also agreed that it would not occupy the disputed area, but would allow it to be a neutral zone.

Immediately after the Syrian troops withdrew, the Israelis broke their promise and drove the Palestinian farmers from the land.

The Syrian troops responded by opening fire to drive out the settlers. Israel responded by complaining that the Syrians had

violated the truce and asserted a right to occupy the areas. UN Truce Observers immediately cited Israel as the instigator and

essentially stated that the Syrian troops were justified in retaliating against Israel for violating the truce agreement.

The Israelis took the strategy that if they completed the water diversion project at Banat Ya�qub, then the UN would back

down because the work simply could not be undone. So the Israelis began working aggressively on the project. They worked

non‑stop, twenty‑four hours a day using searchlights at night to hasten completion. But secrecy was still key. They omitted

appropriations for the project from their published budget. In addition, they did not mention it to Americans working with them

on other water projects; however, US intelligence soon detected their activity.

President Eisenhower and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles realized that Israel had openly deceived them and had no

intention of keeping its earlier promise to cooperate in the American‑sponsored regional water‑usage plan. To show its

displeasure, the Eisenhower administration withheld $26 million under the Mutual Security Act and suspended economic aid

until Israel agreed to cooperate with UN observers. In addition, President Eisenhower directed the Treasury to prepare an

Executive Order removing tax‑deductible status from contributions by Jewish Americans to such Zionist organizations as the

United Jewish Appeal (UJA). Eisenhower did not make these actions public because he did not want to humiliate the Israelis;

however, the Israelis interpreted his magnanimous gesture as a sign of weakness. As a result, they continued work on the

project�convinced that the Americans would back down.

Israel�s strategy might have worked had Israel not launched a bloody raid on the village of Kibya on the night of October 14,

1953. In that attack, twenty‑five‑year‑old Ariel Sharon and his three hundred Israeli commandos, known as Force 101,

massacred fifty‑three Palestinian civilians. According to a UN report, Sharon�s forces drove the villagers into their homes then

blew them up.

The Eisenhower administration condemned the raid and, for the first time, publicly revealed that it had already suspended

construction funds for Israel�s water supply. Their was a huge backlash against Eisenhower. The US government was

denounced by Hadassah, a Jewish charitable organization. An attach� at the Israeli Embassy attempted to divert attention from

the water controversy by claiming�in a widely publicized speech�that the Kibya raid was in response to Jordanian

aggression. Pro‑Israeli congressmen and David Ben‑Gurion accused Eisenhower and his advisers of anti‑Semitism.

But Eisenhower stood firm and continued to withhold funds from Israel. Fearing a financial burden, Israeli representatives

informed President Eisenhower�on October 19�that work had ceased on the water diversion project and that Israel would

cooperate with the Security Counsil�s efforts to solve the Jordan River Development problem. Within twenty‑four hours,

America restored aid to Israel.

Eisenhower demonstrated that Israel responded faster to cutting off the money flow than anything else; however, the Israelis

interpreted America�s quick restoration of aid as proof that they could manipulate the superpower by applying adequate

pressure. Ultimately, Israel completed the project in a slightly altered manner.1

Nov. 1956: The Suez Crisis

The stage was set for the Suez Crisis in 1955 when the Eisenhower administration began pressuring Israel to demonstrate its

commitment to peace in the Middle East.

On February 28, 1955, President Gamal Adbel Nasser made a speech full of warnings against Israeli atrocities. He emphasized

a bloody raid on the Gaza Strip by the Israelis, allegedly a retaliation for raids made from Gaza. Nasser was also upset with the

United States for denying his request for arms a few months earlier. In his speech he repeated the request for Egypt to buy

arms but was ignored.

On September 4, 1955, Egypt announced that it had received a proposal from the Soviet Union for an arms sale. The

Eisenhower administration treated this as an idle threat which angered Nasser. As a result, he brokered a cotton‑for‑arms

barter agreement with Czechoslovakia on September 27 in which Egypt received $200 million worth of arms�tanks, MiG

planes, artillery, submarines, and small arms.

Israel immediately renewed its joint arms agreement with the United States, France, and Britain. In addition, Israel requested a

treaty guaranteeing its security, but it was denied by the Western powers because they knew that Israel�s military strength was

vastly superior to the neighboring Arab nations.

On August 26, 1955, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles made a speech before the Council of Foreign Relations in New

York in which he outlined terms for peace in the Middle East. He stated that the problem of Palestinian refugees could be

solved, but Israel should not be expected to assume the full cost. He proposed that Congress approve an international loan to

finance the resettlement or repatriating of Palestinian refugees. The loan would also help develop irrigation projects to assist

refugees in cultivating their land for growing crops.

The Israelis were somewhat agitated by Dulles�s speech because he mentioned a possible boundary revision. Dulles promptly

responded to clarify the American position. He stated in no uncertain terms that if Sharett and Ben‑Gurion (Israeli leaders)

wanted American diplomatic, political, and military aid, they would have to demonstrate their peaceful intentions by helping

resolve the sensitive problems of Palestinian refugees and boundary disputes. On November 9, President Eisenhower�who

was in a Denver hospital convalescing from a heart attack�confirmed Dulles�s position in a formal statement made from his

hospital bed.2

At that point, it became clear that the United States could no longer be counted on to support Israel�s continuing efforts to

expand its borders. Consequently, Israel turned to the European powers for support. Over the next year, trouble began to arise

over the Suez Canal.

The Suez Canal is a sea‑level waterway running north‑south across the Isthmus of Suez in Egypt to connect the Mediterranean

and the Red seas. The canal separates the African continent from Asia, and it provides the shortest seagoing route between

Europe and the lands lying around the Indian and western Pacific oceans. It is one of the world's most heavily used shipping

lanes.3

On July 26, 1956, Egyptian President Nasser angered Israel and the European powers when he nationalized the Suez Canal.

He took this bold action because he felt that friends of Israel in America had cheated him out of US aide for the Aswan Dam

that Egypt needed for irrigation and power. The dam cost $1.3 billion and Nasser had been given the impression by the

Eisenhower administration that US aide would be forthcoming; however, friends of Israel in America pressured the Senate

Appropriations Committee into blocking funding for the dam. On July 16, 1956, funding was officially denied�much to the

chagrin of President Eisenhower and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles. To make matters worse, the State Department

issued a statement, on July 19, critically appraising Egypt�s international credit. Nasser felt that this was a ruse created by

friends of Israel in America, and he responded by seizing control of the canal and nationalizing the Suez Canal Company in

order to obtain funds for the dam.4

On October 29, 1956, Israel attacked Egypt and advanced toward the Suez Canal. On November 1, British and French

forces also invaded Egypt and began occupation of the canal zone, but growing opposition from President Eisenhower,

Secretary of State Dulles, UN Secretary‑General Dag Hammarskj�ld, and Soviet threats of intervention put an immediate stop

to British and French support, but Israeli troops still occupied the Gulf of Aqaba and the Gaza Strip in defiance of a UN

resolution.5 Eisenhower was so angered by European involvement in the attack that he telephoned British Prime Minister

Anthony Eden and gave him such a tongue‑lashing that the Prime Minister was reduced to tears.6 (Footnote 24)

Eisenhower told Dulles: "Foster, you tell�em, goddamn it, we�re going to apply sanctions, we�re going to the United Nations,

we�re going to do everything that there is to stop this thing." He later explained, "We just told the Israelis it was absolutely

indefensible and that if they expect our support in the Middle East and in maintaining their position, they had better behave�

We went to town right away to give them hell."

UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskj�ld shared Eisenhower�s view that Israel needed to learn to behave. Consequently,

Hammarskj�ld and Ben‑Gurion engaged in some heated exchanges after the UN Secretary General publicly condemned Israel

for its retaliatory actions against Palestinians. In 1956 Ben‑Gurion complained that Hammarskj�ld�s remarks had encouraged

assaults on Israel by Egypt and Jordan. Hammarskj�ld replied as follows:

�� You are convinced that the threat of retaliation has a deterrent effect. I

�� am convinced that it is more of an incitement to individual members of

�� the Arab forces than even what has been said by their own

�� governments. You are convinced that acts of retaliation will stop further

�� incidents. I am convinced that they will lead to further incidents�.You

�� believe that this way of creating respect for Israel will pave the way for

�� sound coexistence with the Arab people. I believe that the policy may

�� postpone indefinitely the time for such coexistence�. I think the

�� discussion of this question can be considered closed since you, in spite

�� of previous discouraging experiences, have taken the responsibility of

�� large‑scale tests of the correctness of your belief.7

On February 2, 1957, the UN General Assembly passed a resolution demanding Israel�s withdrawal from the Gulf of Aqaba

and the Gaza Strip, but Ben‑Gurion refused. Fed up with Israel�s treachery, Eisenhower wrote a strong letter to Ben‑Gurion

demanding Israel�s withdrawal. Still Ben‑Gurion refused.8

Feb. 1957: LBJ Rescued Israel From UN Sanctions

It had been rumored that UN Secretary‑General Dag Hammarskj�ld of Sweden was quietly pushing for sanctions�with the

full support of the Eisenhower administration�against Israel if it continued to maintain troops in the Gulf of Aqaba and Gaza in

defiance of US and UN demands for immediate withdrawal. In response, Lyndon Johnson�then Senate Majority

Leader�wrote a letter to Secretary of State John Foster Dulles urging the Eisenhower Administration not to support UN

sanctions against Israel. Johnson�s letter to Dulles appeared in the New York Times on February 20, 1957. The Senate

Majority Leader�s argument was that it was an unfair double‑standard to punish a small country like Israel when large countries

like the Soviet Union were allowed to openly defy UN resolutions without being punished.9

In addition, Johnson rallied Senate Democrats to oppose Israel sanctions.(Footnote 25) He used partisan politics to pressure

Eisenhower into retreating from principle, but Eisenhower stood his ground and kept applying pressure to Israel by cutting off

or delaying financial assistance. When Israel began to run out of money, in March 1957, Prime Minister David Ben‑Gurion

finally agreed to withdraw troops from the occupied territories. President Eisenhower triumphed, but Johnson had protected

Israel from the humiliation of UN sanctions. Sadly, Eisenhower was the last US president to stand up to the Israeli government

and it�s American supporters. At least he proved it could be done.10

Ironically, one of the best accounts of Lyndon Johnson�s involvement in the Suez Crisis was written by Louis Bloomfield in his

1957 book entitled Egypt, Israel and the Gulf of Aqaba. In the ensuing years, Johnson�s involvement in that conflict has been

erased from history. Although his pro‑Israel stance appeared on the front page of the New York Times on February 20, 1957,

his name is not mentioned in Western history books about the Suez Crisis (none that I have found anyway, except

Bloomfield�s). The power elite within the book publishing industry have apparently been concealing Johnson�s loyalty to Israel

as a means of preventing inquiries by historians, researchers, and investigators about a possible Jewish conspiracy behind the

assassination of President Kennedy years later.

This is how Bloomfield described Johnson�s pro‑Israel stance during the Suez/Gulf of Aqaba Crisis:

�� On February 11th, 1957, Mr. John Foster Dulles, United States

�� Secretary of State, submitted certain Proposals to the Israeli

�� Government which were, in effect, that:

�� "Israel should withdraw her troops from the Gulf of Aqaba region and the

�� Gaza Strip, in accordance with the recommendations of the United

�� Nations General Assembly.

�� The United States should use all its influence to establish the Strait of

�� Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba as an international waterway for the

�� innocent passage of all nations, including Israel.

�� Meanwhile the United States should do everything it could to see that

�� United Nations troops replaced the Israeli troops in the Gaza Strip and

�� that that area should become a kind of de facto United Nations

�� trusteeship where United Nations officials would watch and if possible

�� stop any fighting between Israel and Egypt."

�� Subsequent discussion between the United States Secretary of State

�� and Mr. Abba Eban did not bring about the withdrawal of the Israeli

�� forces from these two areas and rumours began to circulate in the

�� American press that the Afro‑Asian bloc would introduce resolutions

�� calling for economic and military sanctions to force Israel to comply with

�� the withdrawal resolutions.

�� On February 19th, 1957, Senator Lyndon B. Johnson, the Senate

�� Majority Leader, wrote to Mr. John Foster Dulles urging that the United

�� States oppose imposing of economic sanctions against Israel by the

�� United Nations. The letter was endorsed by the Senate Democratic

�� Policy Committee.

�� (Louis Bloomfield, Egypt, Israel, and the Gulf of Aqaba, p. 152)

Jul. 2, 1957: Senator Kennedy Made a Controversial Speech About Algeria

On July 2, 1957, John F. Kennedy�then a US Senator�made a speech, "Facing Facts on Algeria," which denounced

France�s colonial occupation of Algeria and the brutality of the French‑Algerian War. The speech also demonstrated an

understanding of Indochina that would likely have prevented him from escalating US military involvement in Vietnam had he not

been killed.

Historian Richard Mahoney summarized the speech and events that preceded and followed it:

�� Early in 1957, Kennedy decided to make a major critique of the

�� [Eisenhower] administration�s position on France�s colonial war in

�� Algeria. By 1957, the French had committed over 500,000 troops to the

�� effort to suppress the nationalist rebellion. Torture, atrocity, and terror

�� on both sides had turned the pride of France�s empire into a chamber of

�� horrors. �the Eisenhower administration had been maintaining a policy

�� of strict silence in Algeria � at least until Kennedy�s attack, which The

�� New York Times called "the most comprehensive and outspoken

�� arraignment of Western policy toward Algeria yet presented by an

�� American in public office."

�� On July 2, 1957, Kennedy accused the Eisenhower administration of

�� courting disaster in Algeria. He charged that Eisenhower�s policy of

�� non‑involvement in Africa and Asia was really made up of "tepid

�� encouragement and moralizations to both sides, cautious neutrality on

�� all the real issues, and a restatement of our obvious dependence upon

�� our European friends, and our obvious dedication nevertheless to the

�� principles of self‑determination, and our obvious desire not to become

�� involved." The result, Kennedy said, was that, "We have deceived

�� ourselves into believing that we have thus pleased both sides and

�� displeased no one � when, in truth, we have earned the suspicion of

�� all."

�� The previous decade had proven that the tide of nationalism in the Third

�� World � from Indochina to India to Indonesia � was "irresistible,"

�� Kennedy declared. It was time for France to face the fact that Algeria

�� had to be freed. When would the West learn, he asked, that colonies

�� "are like fruit that cling to the tree only till they ripen?" Didn�t the French

� ��debacle in Indochina, which ended at Dien Bien Phu, serve as a

�� warning of what lay ahead for France in Algeria if something were not

�� done?

�� [Referring to lessons that should have been learned from France�s

�� Indochina debacle, Kennedy stated,]

�� "Did that tragic episode not teach us whether France likes it or not,

�� admits it or not, or has our support or not, that their overseas territories

�� are sooner or later, one by one, going to break free and look with

�� suspicion on the Western nations who impeded their steps to

�� independence? � Nationalism in Africa cannot be evaluated purely in

�� terms of the historical and legal niceties argued by the French and thus

�� far accepted by the State Department. National self‑identification

�� frequently takes place by quick combustion which the rain of repression

�� simply cannot extinguish."

�� In the United States, a storm of protest greeted Kennedy�s address on

�� "Facing Facts on Algeria." President Eisenhower complained about

�� "young men getting up and shouting about things." Secretary [of State

�� John Foster] Dulles commented acidly that if the senator wanted to tilt

�� against colonialism, perhaps he might concentrate on the communist

�� variety. Most prominent Democrats were equally scornful. Adlai

�� Stevenson dismissed Kennedy�s speech as "terrible." Dean Acheson

�� described the speech as "foolish words that wound � a dispirited ally."

�� In France, the speech provoked an even more furious outcry. Paris�s

�� largest daily, "Le Figaro," remarked: "It is shameful that our business is

�� so badly directed that we are forced to endure such idiocies." U.S.

�� News and World Report noted that "An American has unified France �

�� against himself!" Responding to Kennedy�s speech, French President

�� Rene Coty told the French Senate that France would "never negotiate

�� with cutthroats since independence would give the 1,200,000

�� Europeans living in Algeria one alternative � leaving their homeland or

�� living at the mercy of fanaticism." French Defense Minister Andre Morice

�� publicly wondered whether Kennedy was "having nightmares." Talk of

�� independence, Morice said, "will cost many more innocent lives,"

�� Harvard historian Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. reported to Kennedy from

�� Paris that summer that "Algeria is beginning to poison France."

�� In Algeria itself, feeling among the European colonists against the

�� speech ran so high that French authorities warned American newsmen

�� and residents to stay off the streets to avoid reprisals. Two days after

�� the speech a bomb exploded outside the American consulate in Algiers.

�� The French Resident Minister in Algiers, Robert Lacoste, called the

�� bomb "a Communist joke" and challenged Kennedy to come to Algeria.

�� The senator declined.

�� Practically no one in the American foreign‑policy establishment

�� regarded the Algeria speech as anything more than a partisan political

�� blast designed to attract attention. But foreign correspondents such as

�� Alistair Cooke of the Manchester Guardian and Henri Pierre of Le Monde

�� recognized what their American counterparts had not � that Kennedy

�� knew what he was talking about on Third World issues. In a letter to the

�� editor of The New York Times, Pierre wrote: "Strangely enough, as a

�� Frenchman I feel that on the whole Mr. Kennedy is more to be

�� commended than blamed for his forthright, frank and provocative

�� speech."

�� Although Le Monde opposed Kennedy�s call for Algerian independence,

�� it identified the senator as one of the few serious students of history in

�� American politics: "The most striking point of the speech of Mr. Kennedy

�� is the important documentation it revealed and his thorough knowledge

�� of the French milieu."

�� (Richard Mahoney, JFK: Ordeal in Africa, pp. 19‑22)

Kennedy, Eisenhower, and Algeria

In his 1957 speech about Algeria, "Senator" Kennedy was highly critical of the Eisenhower administration; however, the

political dynamic involved must be considered. Kennedy�s views about Israel and the Middle East in general were closer to

Eisenhower�s than Johnson�s. Having stated that, it is significant to understand that Kennedy�s public endorsement of an

independent Algeria was a subtle criticism of Israel. It is widely known that Israel opposed Algeria�s independence because it

(Israel) wanted to oppress or dominate all Muslim/Arab states. Although Eisenhower had not publicly supported Algerian

independence, it seems plausible that he may have agreed with Kennedy but lacked the political courage to denounce France

as the young Senator had boldly done in his speech. Upon reflection, Eisenhower may have secretly admired Kennedy for

publicly denouncing America�s World War II ally. After all, France had recently betrayed Eisenhower by secretly conniving

with Israel and Britain to attack Egypt after President Nasser had nationalized the Suez Canal.(Footnote 26)

Kennedy surely understood how much he and Eisenhower agreed on Middle Eastern issues, but Eisenhower belonged to the

opposing political party; and Kennedy and Johnson both had their eyes on the White House in the upcoming 1960 presidential

campaign. Consequently, one of Kennedy�s objectives when making the Algerian speech was likely to differentiate himself from

the sitting Republican President and his Democratic adversary, Johnson. Although Kennedy and Johnson held opposing views

about Israel, they could not openly criticize each other because they were both Democrats. But since Eisenhower was a

Republican, it made sense politically for a Democratic Senator to criticize him for not supporting Algerian independence. The

speech also sent a message to informed political observers that unlike Johnson, Kennedy would not be a minion for Israel if

elected president.

Even more important, Kennedy�s Algerian speech made the front page of the New York Times which put him in the same

league as Senate Majority Leader Johnson. Recall that Johnson had made the front page of the New York Times five months

earlier (Feb. 1957) for opposing Eisenhower�s efforts to place UN sanctions on Israel in the wake of that country�s failed

attempt to seize land from Egypt and overthrow Nasser in the Suez Crisis of 1956 and 57.

Jun. 5, 1967: The Six Day War

Ten years after the Suez Crisis, Israel attacked Egypt again; but this time with success. The event is known as the Six Day War

which began on June 5, 1967. Things had changed a great deal over the ten years leading up to the Six Day War. Israel�s most

influential adversaries had either died or left public office. Eisenhower had retired years earlier and was in failing health. John

Foster Dulles had died of cancer in 1959. Dag Hammarskj�ld had been killed in a mysterious plane crash in the Congolese

province of Katanga in 1961. President Kennedy of course had been assassinated in Dallas in 1963. And Israel�s old ally,

Lyndon Johnson, had become Commander‑in‑Chief of the United States. In July of 1965, President Johnson had appointed

Supreme Court Justice Arthur Goldberg as US ambassador to the UN. Goldberg�a Jew and ardent supporter of

Israel�replaced Adlai Stevenson as US delegate to the UN after Stevenson died suddenly of a heart attack on July 14,

1965.(Footnote 27) The Yemen War had been eroding Arab unity since the conflict began in 1962.(Footnote 28) By 1967,

Egyptian forces had suffered heavy losses and were weakened after five years of military involvement in the Yemen War.

Whether these events were random or planned is anyone�s guess, but they were definitely advantageous to Israel by the time

the Six Day War occurred in 1967.

The Six Day War was a watershed event that transformed Israel from a small nation into a colonial empire. Although Israel

became a nation in 1948, it expanded dramatically after the Six Day War. Israel took from the Arabs�through military

force�the Old City of Jerusalem, the Sinai and the Gaza Strip, the Jordanian territory west of the Jordan River known as the

West Bank, and the Golan Heights, on the Israeli‑Syrian border.11 In addition to acquiring new land, Israel gained control of an

additional 900,000 Arabs who became the discontented subjects of the new Israeli empire. Since 1967, the number of Arabs

under Israel�s military control has grown to over 1.75 million.12

Amnesty International has documented Israel�s inhumane treatment of its Palestinian subjects citing arbitrary arrests, torturing

detainees, destroying or sealing the homes of Arab suspects and their relatives, confiscating land, destroying crops, and

diverting precious water from thirsty Palestinians in the desert to fill the swimming pools and water the lawns of Israeli settlers.13

This conduct is condoned, embraced, and encouraged by the United States through its steadfast financial and military support

of Israel. Today, US tax payers spend approximately $3 billion annually to subsidize, support, and arm Israel. Although Israel is

a wealthy country by western standards, it receives the highest amount of American foreign aid money, 28 percent.14

Jewish scholars Michael Kazin and Maurice Isserman described in their book, America Divided: The Civil War of the 1960s,

the passion ignited within American Jews by the Six Day War. They wrote the following:

�� The swift, complete victory was followed by a long and wrenching

�� occupation of Palestinian lands. For many American Jews, the 1967

�� conflict awakened and inspired passions that did much to transform the

�� meaning of their identity. No longer was Israel just a reason for Jewish

�� pride, a desert miracle of orange groves and thriving kibbutzes, whose

�� creation was romanticized in Exodus‑a popular novel and film of the late

�� '50s and early '60s. Israel was now the homeland of fellow Jews who

�� had fought alone for their survival and were resigned to living in

�� perpetual danger. The threat came not just from Arab militants but from

�� communist powers, their Third World allies, and a good many American

�� leftists who were eager to prove their "anti‑imperialist" credentials. In the

�� face of extinction, Israel became "the ultimate reality in the life of every

�� Jew living today," as a young professor at Brandeis University put it, "In

�� dealing with those who oppose Israel, we are not reasonable and we

�� are not rational. Nor should we be."15

Those are troubling words, but they reflect the true agenda of those who support the Jewish state of Israel.

Background on the Six Day War

Understanding the Six Day War requires some background regarding the politics of the Middle East in 1967. The following

men were heads of state for the countries involved in the Six Day War:

�� Nation

�� Head of State

�� Egypt

�� President Gamal Abdel Nasser

�� Sryia

�� General Salah al‑Jadid

�� Jordan

�� King Hussein [ibn Talal]

�� Israel

�� Prime Minister Levi Eshkol

�� US

�� President Lyndon Baines Johnson

�� USSR

�� Chairman Aleksey Nikolayevich Kosygin

�� UN

�� Secretary General U Thant (of Burma, now Myanmar)

Egyptian President Nasser was a key figure in Middle Eastern affairs for seventeen years. In 1954 he became prime minister of

Egypt, and in 1956 he became that country�s president�remaining in that position until his sudden death in 1970.16 Nasser had

been Israel�s primary enemy because he was a charismatic Muslim leader who advocated Arab unity (also known as

pan‑Arabism).

Egypt has no oil of any consequence, but it has a more advanced culture than the other oil‑producing Arab nations. It was the

home of one of the principal civilizations of the ancient Middle East. It is also one of the earliest urban and literate societies.17

Consequently, the other Arab nations have historically looked to Egypt for leadership.

The original antagonist of Israel in the Six Day War was Syria, led by General Salah al‑Jadid, head of the Ba�th regime.18

Although Syria�under the Ba�th regime�was an aggressive enemy of Israel, Syria�s erratic behavior toward other Arab

nations actually helped Israel. In fact, Israel used Syrian raids along the its border as a pretext for attacking Egypt and starting

the Six Day War.

In March 1963 Ba�thist supporters seized power from the "secessionist" regime in a military coup. With the Ba�th in power,

Nasser had three Arab nations against him. Those nations were Saudi Arabia and Jordan (because they supported the ousted

Imam in the Yemen war) and Syria.

In April 1967 Syrian bombardments of Israeli villages had been intensified. When the Israeli Air Force shot down six Syrian

MiG planes in reprisal, Egypt mobilized its forces near the Sinai border.19 Egypt had a mutual defense agreement with the

Syrians, who now felt themselves in danger. As an advocate of pan‑Arabism, Nasser felt obliged to help Syria. He ordered

part of the Egyptian Army to move into Sinai. He thought that the presence of Egyptian forces would discourage the Israelis

from attacking Syria. It was a purely defensive move designed to draw off Israeli forces from Syria. If Israel had attacked

Syria, then the Egyptian Army would have carried out operations in support of the Syrians. But no offensive operations against

Israel were consider.20

A standoff between Egypt and Israel ensued, and tensions mounted between the superpowers. The Soviet Union supported

Egypt and the United States supported Israel. This raced the stakes considerably because it introduced the possibility of

nuclear war.21

Historians now know that Israel secretly launched an attack against Egypt, but lied about it claiming that Nasser had launched

the attack first. In fact Israeli Prime Minister Menachem

Begin made this admission in a speech on August 8, 1982 before the National Defense College in Jerusalem. He stated that the

Six Day War was not a "war of necessity" but rather a "war of choice� Nasser did not attack us. We decided to attack

him."22 This was a major admission by Begin.

On June 3, 1967, just two days before the Israelis attacked, the United States sent the aircraft carrier Intrepid through the Suez

Canal with all its planes lined up on deck. Nasser thought this was an unnecessary show of force. The Egyptian people became

furious. They lined the bank of the Canal and threw old shoes at the carrier. At the same time the Sixth Fleet flexed its muscles

and prepared for a war situation. It was an excessive show of force by the United States.23

After Israel�s victory, Nasser was disgusted with Johnson. He felt that Johnson was dishonest and had colluded with Israel to

strike first and blame it on Egypt. He was suspicious of America�s UN ambassador Arthur Goldberg, an ardent Zionist.

Goldberg had immediately backed Israel in the UN when it claimed that Egypt "fired the first shot." Nasser accused Johnson of

collusion, broke off diplomatic relations with the United States, and ordered all Americans out of Egypt. Several other Arab

states did the same. Soon Johnson, already angered by the charge of collusion, had to watch the humiliating spectacle of

twenty‑four thousand American men, women, and children being thrown out of the Middle East. Johnson never forgot and

never forgave.24

After Egypt�s humiliating defeat in the Six Day War, Nasser attempted to resign, but massive street demonstrations and a vote

of confidence by the National Assembly induced him to remain in office. The Soviet Union immediately began replacing all the

destroyed war equipment and installed surface‑to‑air missiles along the Suez as a cover for Egypt�s artillery installations.25

An important footnote to the Six Day War is an incident that occurred in Yemen months earlier. In early 1967, fighting in

Yemen still continued. One day there was shooting in Taiz (in Yemen). Direction finders indicated that two bazooka shots came

from the headquarters of the United States Point Four Aid Program�which was the CIA's cover organization. Yemeni

government forces attacked the building and arrested the four people inside. The safes were opened and an enormous number

of documents were found and subsequently photographed by Egyptian intelligence experts.(Footnote 29) The United States was

furious at the attack on the building and demanded the documents. They were returned three weeks later, but by that time their

secrets were known. Many people within the United States military became extremely hostile toward Nasser because of this

event. Some believe the Six Day War was a form of retribution.26

UN Resolution 242

Within six months after the Six Day War, the UN Security Council issued Resolution 242 which called for "withdrawal of Israeli

armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict." In theory the UN should enforce the resolution itself, but

unfortunately, reality is much different. The sad truth is the UN is unable to enforce much of anything without the support of the

United States, and the United States has maintained a "passionate attachment" to Israel ever since President Johnson was in

office.

Ironically, Resolution 242 was issued on the fourth anniversary of President Kennedy�s death, November 22, 1967.27 It is an

extremely important document because virtually all disputes between Israel and the Palestinians and neighboring Arab states

could be resolved by its enforcement.

In addition, the Israelis managed to secure ambiguous, legalistic wording for Resolution 242 which makes even more difficult to

enforce;28 however, the resolution remains a highly sensitive area for American presidents and politicians to roam. The

following is the entire text of the resolution:

�� The Security Council,

�� Expressing its continuing concern with the grave situation in the Middle

�� East,

�� Emphasizing the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war and

�� the need to work for a just and lasting peace in which every State in the

�� area can live in security,

�� Emphasizing further that all Member States in their acceptance of the

�� Charter of the United Nations have undertaken a commitment to act in

�� accordance with Article 2 of the Charter,

�� 1. Affirms that the fulfillment of Charter principles requires the

�� establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East which

�� should include the application of both the following principles:

�� (i) Withdrawal of Israel armed forces from territories occupied in the

�� recent conflict;

�� (ii) Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for

�� and acknowledgment of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political

�� independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace

�� within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of

�� force;

�� 2. Affirms further the necessity

�� (a) For guaranteeing freedom of navigation through international

�� waterways in the area;

�� (b) For achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem;

�� (c) For guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political independence

�� of every State in the area, through measures including the

�� establishment of demilitarized zones;

�� 3. Requests the Secretary‑General to designate a Special

�� Representative to proceed to the Middle East to establish and maintain

�� contacts with the States concerned in order to promote agreement and

�� assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in

�� accordance with the provisions and principles in this resolution;

�� 4. Requests the Secretary‑General to report to the Security Council on

�� the progress of the efforts of the Special Representative as soon as

�� possible.

�� (UN Security Council Resolution 242 of November 22, 1967)

Jun. 8, 1967: Israel Attacked the USS Liberty

In the midst of the Six Day War, Israel attacked the USS Liberty spy vessel killing 34 American sailors and wounding 75.

George Ball wrote a riveting account of Israel�s attack on the USS Liberty on June 8, 1967. Ball�s comments are significant

because he was undersecretary of state in the Johnson and Kennedy administrations. The following text is an excerpt from

Ball�s book, The Passionate Attachment: America�s Involvement With Israel, 1947 to the Present:

�� During the [Six Day] War, Israel attacked the USS Liberty. The Liberty

�� was an American intelligence‑gathering vessel, then cruising in

�� international waters near Egypt and reading the radio transmissions on

�� both sides. It flew the American flag and was painted in US Navy colors,

�� complete with number and name.

�� On the fourth day of the war [June 8, 1967], with both Jordan and Egypt

�� routed, the Israelis turned their attention to Syria, the original cause of all

�� this trouble. Guns mounted on the Golan Heights had subjected Galilee

�� to sporadic bombardment for years and the Israelis had every intention

�� of capturing those Heights before hostilities were over. Meanwhile, the

�� United Nations had adopted a cease‑fire resolution and they feared

�� there might not be enough time to accomplish this objective without, as

�� it were, going into overnight.

�� The Liberty�s presence and function were known to Israeli leaders. They

�� presumably thought it vital that the Liberty be prevented from informing

�� Washington of their intentions to violate any cease‑fire before they had

�� completed their occupation of the Golan. Their solution was brutal and

�� direct.

�� Israel aircraft determined the exact location of the ship and undertook a

�� combined air‑naval attack. Apprised of Israel�s plans from various

�� sources, the US Navy Department faced a delicate problem. Due

�� regard for the lives of America�s naval personnel should have impelled

�� the Navy to urge the State Department to warn off Israel in no uncertain

�� terms; meanwhile, the Navy have alerted the Liberty to its danger and

�� dispatched ships or planes for its protection. But none of these actions

�� was taken in time.

�� There has, for years, been a continuing argument about the tragic

�� lapse. Some say that a warning to Israel might have exposed U.S.

�� sources of secret intelligence. Whatever the motive, the President or

�� one of his aides took the decision to risk the ship and its crew, and

�� merely ordered them, without explanation, to steam west at top speed.

�� Unhappily, that notice was too little and taken too late. Israeli ships and

�� planes attacked, killing 34 American sailors, wounding 75, and leaving

�� 821 rocket and machine‑gun holes in the Liberty. It was only when the

�� Israelis were preparing to board the ship that American planes belatedly

�� appeared from the west and forced them to retire.

�� The sequel was unedifying. The [Johnson] administration tried

�� vigorously to downplay the whole matter. Although it silenced the crew,

�� casualties to the sailors and damage to the ship could not possibly be

�� concealed. Thus, an elaborate charade was performed. The United

�� States complained pro forma to Israel, which reacted by blaming the

�� victims. The ship, they rejoined, had not been clearly marked but looked

�� like an Arab ship�which was definitely untrue. Nor did the Israelis even

�� pretend that they had queried the American Embassy in Tel Aviv

�� regarding the status of the well‑marked ship. In the end, the Israelis

�� tendered a reluctant and graceless apology; indemnities for the victims

�� and damaged ship were both parsimonious and slow in coming. The

�� sordid affair has still not been erased from the history books; an

�� organization of devoted survivors has kept the cause alive over the

�� years by publishing a newsletter and holding well‑advertised meetings.